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This dissertation examines the conversion decision of a landowner from an undeveloped or 
agricultural use to a subdivision in the presence of an active housing market and an active land 
preservation program. It utilizes a unique panel dataset and incorporates a real options 
framework to evaluate the impacts of housing market volatility on conversion timing. At the 
same time, this work evaluates the impact of a preservation program on the timing of conversion. 
Typical program evaluation of this type focuses on quantity or quality of acres enrolled. This 
work focuses on the timing of the conversion decision and involves a potential program benefit 
that is not related to enrollment in the preservation program itself. The benefit of a delayed 
conversion decision is a desirable outcome for the county even if parcels ultimately convert to a 
developed state. Hazard models are estimated which account for multiple exit states, i.e. 
competing risks, of conversion or preservation and correlation among these competing risks is 
modeled. Results of these models suggest that price volatility, as well as eligibility for the 
preservation program, significantly delays conversion decisions. The median estimated delay 
induced by easement eligibility ranges from 7 years to over 20 years depending on parcel size. 
However, enrollment in a preservation easement may impact neighboring land use 
decisions in the presence of spillover effects. That is, an enrolled parcel may attract development 
in the sense that neighboring parcels become more likely to convert. A propensity score 
matching procedure is utilized to quantify the spillover effect of preservation activity on future 
surrounding land conversion decisions. The propensity score estimation approach allows a semi-
parametric estimate which controls the non-random selection or endogeneity of preservation 
activity. Results of this model suggest that parcels neighboring recent preservation activity are 
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1. Introduction and Policy Environment 
 
There has been much discussion about the pace of land use change in recent 
decades especially in ex-urban areas of the country.1   In many areas land use change 
has taken the form of forest or farmland converting to low density residential use. 
According to a recent government publication approximately 80% of the nearly 2 
million acres of land recently used for new housing is located outside urban areas 
(Heimlich and Anderson, 2001). Although accurate statistics are difficult to obtain 
about the rate or amount of conversion in any particular area, the level of concern 
expressed by local governments in many states provides, at a minimum, indirect 
evidence for the prevalence of this land conversion issue. Many local governments 
have responded to this conversion activity by implementing policies to preserve land 
in openspace (farmland) or by enacting regulations to slow the pace of development; 
some have done both. Since 1988, over 53 localities have passed more than $111 
billion in conservation measures and these referenda have been exceedingly popular 
with over 75% of such measures passing (Trust for Public Land, 2007).  
  Because directly regulating development is both politically and legally 
difficult, jurisdictions are looking toward incentive based mechanisms to manage the 
pace and pattern of urban growth and the conversion of agricultural land. Under one 
such mechanism, landowners voluntarily receive payment for agreeing to forego 
conversion and accept easements placed on their land. Since the first ‘purchase of 
development rights’ (PDR) program was implemented in 1974, over 53 state and 
                                                 
1 Exurban areas are defined as locations outside of metropolitan areas but within their ‘commuter-




local governments have collectively spent almost $3.723 billion in public funds to 
preserve nearly 1.67 million acres in the U.S. (American Farmland Trust, 2005). In 
2002 the Federal government authorized $986 million in matching funds for farmland 
preservation for the 2002-2006 period. PDR programs enjoy continued taxpayer 
support; in 2003 alone, $700 million in state and local ballot measures were passed to 
provide funding for farm and ranch land protection (Trust for Public Land).  
In urbanizing areas where landowners can choose to reap immediate financial 
windfalls through development, PDR’s offer an alternative that allows them to 
continue farming while receiving remuneration for their development rights. 
Empirical studies have characterized decisions to participate in PDR programs (e.g., 
Nickerson, 2000; Duke, 2004), or evaluated efficiency and distributional aspects of 
these programs (Nickerson and Barnard, 2004; Lynch and Musser, 2001; Lynch and 
Lovell, 2003). 
Given the significant costs involved in preserving farmland – which averages 
approximately $2,000 per acre nationally (American Farmland Trust) but varies 
greatly over regions of the country – government agencies are increasingly interested 
in the effectiveness of PDR programs. A couple of studies have considered the effects 
of preservation programs on rates of urban development and found limited evidence 
that these programs slow land conversion rates (Lynch and Carpenter, 2003; Lynch 
and Liu, 2007). Other studies suggest that PDR programs may actually hasten the 
development of adjacent parcels by making this land more valuable in residential use, 
due to a positive spillover effect (e.g., Irwin, 1998; Irwin and Bockstael, 2002; 




Until recently, no studies had explored the effects of the existence of PDR 
programs on land development decisions themselves. In a paper that arose from 
preliminary work on this dissertation (Towe, Nickerson and Bockstael, 2008), we 
consider the impacts of a preservation program on conversion decisions but we 
implement a class of models that is potentially inadequate in fully describing the 
conversion decision. This dissertation estimates a class of models that accounts for 
two primary shortfalls of the previous work, incorporation of multiple exit states and 
unobservable heterogeneity of landowners and land parcels. 
Chapters 2-5 of this dissertation explore how the existence of an option to 
participate in a PDR program affects landowners’ development decisions. This is 
done by utilizing a theoretically appropriate model that matches the true decision 
environment where the choice set of eligible landowners includes enrollment in an 
easement, conversion, or the status quo. Even if a landowner chooses not to preserve, 
the existence of an option to do so may alter the time at which conversion occurs. 
Results from real options theory suggest that this may be the case – and, in particular, 
that the existence of the PDR option may delay conversion decisions.  
With any program, incentive based or regulatory, there are often unintended 
consequences. Inevitably, the question which arises from these farmland preservation 
programs concerns the impact on neighboring parcels. If surrounding land use has an 
effect on the value of a parcel in a given land use, then it follows that surrounding 
land use will also have an effect on the likelihood of a parcel being developed. In the 
presence of such interaction effects, policies that alter development decisions can 




policy. The existence of interactions among neighboring parcels leads logically to 
path dependence in land use and pattern change. Concisely stated, do perpetual 
easement programs change the likelihood of development for the surrounding 
parcels?  Previous work attempting to evaluate the impact of openspace on 
surrounding property values by Irwin (1998) and others suggests this is likely the 
case. Chapters 6 and 7 address the spillover effect of enrollment in the preservation 
program on neighboring parcels by utilizing an econometric technique to control for 
the endogeneity of preservation activity. An increase in the probability of conversion 
for surrounding parcels might mitigate the ability of the preservation activity to 
protect the rural landscape. 
In summary, many proponents of land preservation focus on directly 
measurable quantities like the number of acres preserved as a measure of program 
success, but the benefits and costs of these programs likely extend beyond the 
quantity of land preserved. More difficult to measure goals, but ones often voiced by 
local governments, include maintenance of a functioning rural landscape and a curb 
on urban expansion.2  This dissertation considers the possibility that these programs 
may generate benefits beyond those provided by the farmland enrolled in the 
programs by delaying development and allowing the county time to build 
infrastructure to meet the demands of recent urban expansion.3  But it also addresses 
in part the possibility that the program, by creating pockets of permanently preserved 
land, may attract surrounding development activity.  
                                                 
2 Both farmland preservation and these additional ‘farmland’ benefits do come at a cost, however: the 
foregone benefits associated with development. Whether the one outweighs the other is not at issue in 
this paper. 




 1.1 Policy Environment  
 
Because of the nature of property rights in the U.S., a limited number of policy 
instruments are available to the public sector to affect land use pattern and land use 
change. Land use policies are implemented at the state or local level and so can vary 
considerably across regions of the country. However, all are subject to challenges 
under the ‘Takings Clause’ of the U.S. Constitution, which restricts the degree to 
which public actions are allowed to affect the market value of a parcel and therefore 
the extent to which direct land use control is possible.  
The study area for the empirical portion of this paper is Howard County in the 
state of Maryland (see Figure 1.1), so described below are the types of land use 
controls that are typically implemented in this region. While zoning ordinances serve 
to restrict the location of commercial and industrial uses, it is typically not possible to 
prohibit residential development except under very special circumstances (such as 
particularly extreme environmental conditions). Mentioned here are four common 
types of policies that attempt to affect the spatial pattern of residential development. 
In each case, the policies are designed so as to have differential effects across 
locations within a given locality. 
• Regulations that require different configurations of development in different 
regions of the locality. Zoning stipulates the maximum overall density of new 
residential development in any given area. In recent years, many counties in 
Maryland facing development pressure have attempted to protect rural areas 
by ‘down-zoning’ (reducing the maximum allowable densities) in order to 




the concept of clustered development. Although the total number of housing 
lots does not change, clustering either allows or requires smaller housing lots 
than would be implied by maximum allowable densities, but clustered on one 
portion of a parcel, leaving the remainder in non-built uses. Zoning 
regulations can also stipulate that a portion of the parcel be set aside in 
common open space, even if clustering is not required. 
• Moratoria that temporarily slow development rates in specific areas. 
Adequate public facilities moratoria can be used by Maryland counties to 
close a school district to further development for up to three years if school 
capacity has been reached. 
• Public works projects that encourage development in some areas by providing 
more public services. Chief among these is the provision of public water and 
sewer service, which reduces infrastructure costs of construction.  
• Programs that support the public purchase of development rights of land 
parcels in specifically targeted areas. These include state and locally funded 
programs to purchase development easements from landowners and thus 
preserve chiefly agricultural lands, although forested lands can be preserved 





Figure 1.1:  Map of Study Area. 
 
Howard County, Maryland is not an extremely large county in area, totaling 
only 160,000-acres, but it is unique because its location, wealth, and rural history 
combine to create competing preferences for growth and open space preservation. As 
shown in Figure 1.1 Howard lies between Baltimore to its east, Washington, D.C. to 
its south, and the growing city of Frederick to its west. Residents commute to all 
these employment centers, and as such the entire county is in one or another city’s 
‘commuting shed’. Not surprisingly Howard County has experienced heavy 
development pressure over the last several decades. A simple review of the census 
data is quite revealing. Over the course of the study period relevant to this dissertation 




increase) and median home values rose from $206,000 to $425,000 (in 2000 dollars) - 
a 105% increase. Additional pressure is being exerted by neighboring counties that 
have ‘downzoned’ their agricultural areas to allow only extremely low density 
development (i.e. one house per 15 to 25 acres). In contrast, allowable densities 
outside the public water and sewer service boundaries in Howard County – that is, 
land nominally eligible for agricultural preservation – can be developed at densities of 
one house per 3 to 4.25 acres. 
In Howard County, and indeed in most of the U.S., the primary mechanism 
for land use regulation is zoning which limits the number of units per acre via density 
requirements, open space requirements, and/or environmental restrictions. As a land 
preservation mechanism, zoning is not a very useful tool because zoning regulations 
are impermanent and, in most cases, cannot entirely prohibit land conversion.4  
Prohibitive, or even highly restrictive, zoning is likely to be challenged in court if 
landowners are not adequately compensated. Other than zoning and offering the 
preservation easement option, the county has relied on adequate public facilities 
ordinances to manage the pace and pattern of development. These ordinances allow 
the county to postpone, temporarily, new subdivision construction in any planning 
zone with insufficient school (and, more recently, road) capacity until new 
infrastructure can be built.  
  In this policy environment the Howard County PDR program purchases 
development rights from landowners in perpetuity and thus offers a mutually 
agreeable means for achieving permanent land preservation. In general, PDR 
                                                 
4 Prohibitions on land conversion for environmental reasons are possible in some parts of Maryland – 




programs sever the development potential from the land while allowing the 
landowner to pursue any other permitted use of the land. As with many ‘purchase of 
development rights’ programs, Howard County’s program purchases easements that 
prohibit conversion of land to specific non-agricultural uses, with the easement 
attached to the land in perpetuity, thus applying to all future land owners. The 
county’s program is somewhat unique, however, in that the enrollment process is not 
bureaucratically cumbersome. In contrast, the state of Maryland’s agricultural 
preservation program (MALPF – Maryland Agricultural Land Preservation 
Foundation), in operation since 1977, requires landowners to enroll in an agricultural 
district prior to selling easements. This constitutes a burden in a rapidly developing 
landscape. By the late 1980’s, the terms of the county’s program had become so 
favorable relative to the state’s program that Howard County landowners universally 
chose the former over the latter. The county program paid over 3 times the price per 
acre offered under the MALPF program. 
1.1.1 Preservation Program Details 
 
When Howard County instituted the PDR program in 1980, about 34 percent 
of its 161,408 acres were in farmland. The goal of the program was to enroll 30,000 
acres. Over the decades of the 1980’s and 90’s, more than 16,000 acres (at a cost of 
approximately $193 million dollars) were preserved in a PDR program while 
approximately 20,000 acres of the county were developed in residential uses.5  These 
16,000-plus preserved acres represent about 10% of Howard County’s land.  
                                                 
5 With the exception of some MALPF preservations in the early years, most of these 16,000 acres were 




  To qualify for the county PDR program, a parcel must be at least 100 acres; 
parcels at least 25 acres qualify if adjacent to at least 50 acres of preserved farmland. 
Eligibility requires 50% of land to be in the best soil classes and 66% in the top four 
of six land capability classes, as defined by the NRCS.6  In addition, only parcels not 
served by public sewer and water are eligible. The price a landowner can expect to 
receive for an easement in the county PDR program is based on a published, publicly 
available, formula. For example, the county pays a higher price for parcels with better 
soils, more surrounding agricultural land, less erosion or drainage problems, and more 
actively farmed land in the production of food or fiber. The amount of public road 
frontage also adds value to a parcel in enrollment, for an example price formula 
worksheet see Appendix A.  
The county ranks the applications based on the same criteria as in the pricing 
formula together with subjective information on the parcel’s contribution to the 
farming industry (for example, farms with feed distribution facilities are ranked 
higher) and its viability in farming. Landowners are entitled to develop “family lots” 
while enrolled in the preservation program at a density of one lot per 50 acres 
enrolled. These family lots are meant to encourage farm transfers between 
generations, but there are no restrictions on the sale of these lots so landowners 
willing to forgo or limit this entitlement receive higher rankings. Parcels whose 
owners have offered to sell their easements are ranked on the basis of the above 
considerations and the county extends offers until funds are exhausted in each year. 
Deadlines for application are typically in November and decisions are made by the 
                                                 
6 These eligibility requirements remained constant during the study period, but were slightly modified 




county in the following spring. To address environmental concerns each preserved 
farm must file a conservation plan with the county.  
Over the life of the Howard County Agricultural Preservation Program, 
funding has been an issue. Parcels were preserved during the 1980’s under a lump 
sum payment option which limited the amount of enrollment due to the significant 
payments coming from the county. In 1988 significant funds were appropriated (55 
million) and again in 2000 (15 million), leading to easement purchases in 1990-97 
and 2002 to the present, respectively.  
In addition to the funds injected into the program, financing and payment 
changes were made in 1988. First, the financing system was converted from a one-
time payout to a tax free installment payout for 30 years and a balloon payment for 
the full easement amount at term end. From the landowners’ perspective this greatly 
eased the tax consequences of enrollment and from the county’s perspective this 
allowed the financial outlay to be spread across many years enabling more 
enrollments in each year. For example, a landowner with 100 acres receiving $6,000 
an acre would initially have received a one-time easement payment of $600,000. 
Under the new terms, the landowner would receive a tax exempt payment each year 
of 6.5% of the easement value and at the end of the term a balloon payment of the full 
easement value, resulting in payments of over 1.7 million to the landowner but spaced 
out over 30 years. The county finances the payments by buying a bond to cover the 
principal amount, resulting in a first year outlay of approximately $60,000 rather than 
$600,000. This new system has enabled the county to purchase many more easements 




The second major change concerned the funding source. As of 1988 the 
funding was tied to a 0.25% tax on real estate sales transactions, so that funding was 
secured via activity in the development market and future funding could be reliably 
forecast. Additionally a majority of the 5% conversion tax on land losing the 
preferential agricultural tax due to conversion has been dedicated to the PDR 
program. Since 1988 no general fund monies have been used to purchase 
development rights. The maximum payment per acre was set at $6,600 in 19887, 
adjusted to $20,000 in 2001, and is currently at $40,000 an acre. 
From 1998 to 2000 the program had exhausted forecasted funds and no land 
was preserved.8  From the very start of the program, the county’s budget constraint 
was binding. Applicants whose parcels received a relatively low subjective ranking 
were either unable to preserve or experienced delays in the timing of preservation. 
Figure 1.2 shows the distribution of preservation activity over time. Arguably, recent 
decades represent the first time in history that the value of land in exurban counties 
exceeds the value of the productive resources of the land. This PDR program is 
designed to offer existing landowners the ability to extract some of the gains in land 
value that are ordinarily only accessible by converting land to development.   
                                                 
7 For comparison the estimated development value was $15,000 per acre at this time per the county 
documentation proposing the changes to the financing structure. 









2. Theoretical Framework 
 
In order to analyze the effects of a land preservation program on development 
decisions, a theoretical model of the timing of development decisions serves as a 
necessary starting point.  
2.1 The Traditional Net Present Value Rule and Extensions 
 
Land conversion occurs when the land use is changed from an undeveloped or 
agricultural state to a developed state. The traditional  economic model used to 
evaluate land conversion decisions implies a landowner will switch land use when the 
discounted stream of returns to development exceeds the discounted returns to the 
status quo land use — either agriculture, forestry, or a natural vegetative state. This is 
a net present value (NPV) approach (Carrion-Flores and Irwin, 2004; Parks, 1995; 
Brownstone and De Vany, 1991; Stavins and Jaffe, 1990).  
Each period in which the land remains in the status quo state the landowner is 
viewed as making a decision about his land. The decision to subdivide is the first step 
in an irreversible development process and thus is the important decision to model for 
land use conversion. Subdivision is expensive to the landowner because it requires a 
change in tax status as well as legal, regulatory, and drafting fees. An alternative end 
state for undeveloped land in the study area is enrollment in the county agricultural 




in an easement program in perpetuity9 and to ‘conversion’ or ‘development’ refers to 
subdividing a parcel into housing lots unless explicitly stated otherwise. The small 
amount of land that is zoned ‘commercial/industrial’ is ignored, as commercial 
development is not an option in areas where preservation is possible. 
Putting the preservation option aside for the moment, the traditional 
conversion decision rule is the net present value rule which suggests a landowner will 
change land use at the moment the return to conversion is greater than the discounted 
sum of future agricultural returns.10  The net present value rule (NPV) prescribes 
conversion when 
(1) D(i,t) -  C(i,t) > β s
s





( , ) . 
sβ is the discount rate and A(i, t+s) is the return to agriculture for parcel i in period 
t+s, so that the right hand side of (1) is the discounted net present value of all future 
agricultural returns. C(i,t) is the conversion cost which may include real estate fees 
and infrastructure costs, and D(i,t) is the return to the landowner from subdividing. 
This return might come as a lump sum or a stream of payments. A one-time payment 
occurs if the landowner sells directly to a developer. However if the landowner 
contracts with a developer or undertakes the conversion himself, the return is a stream 
of payments over the course of the lot sales. Unfortunately, detailed transaction 
specific data are not available, making payment structures impossible to distinguish, 
                                                 
9 Throughout the term ‘parcel’ is used to refer to the original, undeveloped land unit and ‘lot’ to refer 
to each of the subdivided land units. 
10 For the moment the analysis will ignore the fact that land not in agricultural use or developed use 
(simply “undeveloped” land) has a negative return stream based on the NPV approach in an accounting 
sense, although it may generate utility to its owner. Since forest use is an agricultural use, the 




and from here on the model is presented in terms of a one-time payment to the 
landowner.  
In many exurban areas of Howard County, development returns net of 
conversion costs can be expected to exceed the discounted stream of agricultural 
returns for most parcels, yet we do not observe all parcels immediately converting to 
development. In such areas, the NPV conversion rule implies more land conversion 
than is actually observed. This rule does not take into account expectations that future 
development returns might be growing at a rapid rate, making postponement desirable 
even in the face of high current returns to development. This possibility can be 
captured in a modification of the above rule, such that conversion occurs if the net 
returns to development today exceed the expected net returns if development is 
postponed one period. Development will occur under this rule if: 
 
(2) D(i,t) -  C(i,t) > At(i,t)+ β{ E[D(i,t+1)]-C(i,t+1)} 
 
where E[] is the expectation operator. This framework implies that all parcels will 
eventually be profitable for development and follows from the expectation of no real 
growth in agricultural returns in the region or growth that is slow relative to growth 
in development returns as to be trivial. In exurban areas it may be reasonable to 
assume that as developable land becomes scarce the growth in development returns 
will swamp returns to other uses. The expression in (2) mimics a stochastic dynamic 
programming approach and has formed the basis of previous research on 




attributed to expected ongoing increases in development returns due to land scarcity 
and development pressure from growing populations and/or incomes.  
The alternative end state – preservation – can be introduced into this 
framework. The returns to preservation equal the value of holding the land in 
perpetuity. This is most easily represented as the present value of an infinite stream of 
agricultural returns, but may also include non-monetary utility-generating motives 
such as the value of holding a large tract of land for aesthetic or recreational use or 
the value of preserving a family farm. Defining y as the present value of expected 
returns from the landowner’s optimal decision, and ignoring the non-measurable/non-
monetary returns from preservation, the decision rule is now based on the maximum 
value function:   
(3) y = max{ β s
s





( , ) + e(i), E[D(i,t)] – C (i,t), A(i,t)+β( E[D(i,t+1)]-C(i,t+1)}.  
The first term in (3) is the monetary return to preservation, equaling the returns to 
agriculture in perpetuity plus the easement payment, e(i), which varies over parcels. 
The second term is the expected net development return if development is initiated in 
the current period. The third term represents the returns from agriculture in the 
current period plus the discounted expected net returns from postponing development 
until the next period.  
2.2 A Real Options Model of Land Conversion 
 
A key element of the models in expressions (2) and (3) is the term 
representing the value of waiting. The value of waiting to make an investment is 




future is of value. Many economists have compared the development decision to the 
exercise of an option (see Capozza and Li, 1994; Capozza and Hensley, 1990; Geltner 
et al., 1996; Plantinga, Lubowski, and Stavins, 2002). Real options are like financial 
options but pertain to real assets such as land.  
Unlike a NPV conversion rule, a real options approach allows uncertainty to 
influence decisions. Specifically, the option to invest in the future has value which 
helps explain why undeveloped parcels exist even when development returns exceed 
returns from the current use. Three characteristics define a real option: 
• The option, once exercised, is irreversible. 
• The decision can be delayed. 
• Uncertainty exists about future payoffs. 
Land conversion exhibits all these features. First, developed land is generally not 
converted back to agricultural land. Second, the decision can be delayed and, in most 
cases, cannot be removed from the parcel owner by right, eminent domain cases 
being the exception. Finally, the payoffs are uncertain because future property values 
are uncertain.  
In most real options models of land use and in the model being proposed here, 
the uncertainty associated with decisions is concentrated in the returns to future 
development. The landowner is assumed to have far less uncertainty over returns to 
current uses (which may be effectively zero or may experience little variation over 
time) and to easement payments (as they follow published county formula). However 
future returns to development – and especially growth in those returns – may be 




and incomes, as well as changes in interest rates and in the demographic composition 
of the population. Therefore the primary driver in this model is the uncertainty in 
development returns.  
The basic real options story is outlined in many sources (see Dixit and 
Pindyck, 1994, Ch. 5), so the focus of this discussion is on the key elements relevant 
to the empirical model to be described in the next chapter. The problem is one of 
choosing the optimal time to invest in a project with return of D and an investment 
cost of C. D is assumed to evolve over time following a geometric Brownian motion 
with drift: 
 
(4)     DdzDdtdD σα +=  . 
 
In equation (4), α is the ‘drift’ (i.e. the rate of growth) in expected returns, σ is the 
standard error of the investment value, and dz is an increment of a Weiner process or 
the continuous time equivalent of a random walk. Equation (4) implies that the 
current value of the project is known, but future values are uncertain. 11  The change 
in development value is assumed distributed log normal with a variance that grows 
linearly with the time horizon.12   
                                                 
11 In the land conversion model, the drift and variance parameters are time varying. This does not 
change the interpretation. 
12 Employing techniques described in Marathe and Ryan (2005) the assumption of log normality is 
validated. This is done by testing whether the change in inflation adjusted house prices departs from a 
log normal distribution. Specifically, the difference in the log mean sales prices from year t and t-1, by 






In this study D represents the gross return to the landowner from subdividing 
the parcel and selling the resulting lots to households. D is a function of parcel, 
neighborhood, and regional characteristics that are likely to influence development 
returns. The value of the option to convert land in the future is defined by the function 
F(D): 
 







where T is the optimal time of conversion, C
~
 is the cost of conversion including 
opportunity costs of foregoing future agricultural returns, and ρ is the discount rate.13 
C
~
 is assumed to vary little in real terms over the foreseeable time horizon. The option 
will be exercised when the return to investment exceeds the expected capital 
appreciation in the value of the option.  
The solution to the problem must satisfy several conditions, including 
continuity restrictions and an ‘absorbing boundary’ condition - if the option value 
goes to zero it stays at zero. In the land use context, a zero option value would imply 
that the development option is no longer available, which is typically not possible 
unless the landowner enters a preservation easement. Dixit and Pindyck derive the 
solution to the optimal timing decision as: 
 







                                                 
13 It is necessary for ρ > α. That is, the impatience embodied in the discount rate must exceed the mean 





where the term pre-multiplying C
~
represents the wedge between the real options 
investment rule and the neoclassical (NPV) investment rule. The termψ  is a function 
of the drift (α ), standard error (σ ), and a discount rate ( ρ ) and is shown by Dixit 
and Pindyck to be positive and greater than 1. Therefore, in a world of growing 
development returns, the real options rule represents delayed development relative to 
the NPV rule. 
Dixit and Pindyck derive the comparative static results that are the basis for 
inclusion of the variance and drift variables in this empirical application. They show 
that ψ  is decreasing in both drift (α ) and standard error (σ ). Since 
0)1()
~
( 2 <−+−=∂∂ ∗ ψψ ACD , a decrease in ψ  implies a larger wedge between 
investment return and cost. This increases the hurdle to development and delays the 
optimal time to convert. The comparative static results from the options framework 
imply that increases in the variance and drift of the returns to development decrease 
ψ  and thus will tend to delay conversion decisions. The theory of real options is quite 
elegant and intuitive despite the mathematical complexity however testing the 
implications of this theory has proven quite elusive perhaps due to the intense data 
requirements necessary. The next chapter describes the necessary empirical 





3. The Empirical Framework 
 
  
The initial hypothesis concerns whether or not preservation eligibility affects 
the timing of the development decision. In the event that a statistically significant 
effect is found, it is also of interest to quantify the magnitude of the impact. The last 
chapter framed the decision process for the landowner in the context of an options 
model where the landowner had three choices at any given time - convert, preserve, 
or wait. This section presents an empirical model capable of estimating the 
preservation eligibility impact on the conversion decision as well as the impact of 
price volatility in the time dimension. Although the easement price does not fluctuate 
explicitly with market conditions, qualification for the easement program does 
present an additional option which is expected to enter the decision process of the 
landowner when making land use decisions. 
Many land use studies evaluate conversion decisions utilizing discrete choice 
models as a function of parcel level attributes (Bockstael, 1996; McMillen, 1989; 
Kline and Alig, 1999; Landis and Zhang, 1998). This approach provides insights on 
how parcel attributes affect the probability of conversion but does not account for the 
dynamic environment in which conversion decisions are made. Duration models, on 
the other hand, are particularly useful for studying factors affecting the occurrence 
and timing of decisions and are increasingly applied in a land use context (Mayer and 
Somerville, 2000; Irwin and Bockstael, 2002; Bulan, Mayer, and Somerville, 2002; 




Duration models are employed because the addition of a time dimension 
allows for more sophisticated preservation program evaluation – something more than 
just counting acres preserved. Also, duration models can incorporate time varying 
covariates which help account for the dynamic environment in which land use 
decisions are made. Duration models explicitly take account of the fact that an action 
taken in period t implies the action was not taken in any previous period, T<t. This 
model will be used to test the impacts of the preservation option on the timing of 
conversion and to test the comparative static results from real options theory. In order 
to be more confident in the results, several obstacles must be overcome - most 
importantly the impact of unobserved heterogeneity and the assumption of non-
random censoring.   
This chapter will briefly cover the basics of duration analysis, then highlight 
the issues of unobserved heterogeneity and non-random censoring and mention how 
each will be addressed in estimation. The desired model is one that is robust in the 
presence of unobserved heterogeneity and allows the existence of a competing exit 
state, or risk. In the lingo of duration models, preservation and development outcomes 
are referred to as “risks” and the observed failure event is the act of subdivision or the 
act of enrollment in the preservation program. The fact that multiple risks exist tends 
to greatly complicates analysis but leads to a richer model that closely mimics the 
decision process outlined in the previous chapter. Again, the primary goal of this 
estimation is to quantify the impact of eligibility on development timing in the real 




appropriate parametric functional form for prediction and simulation of future land 
conversion patterns.  
3.1 Duration Analysis – the Basics 
 
An exhaustive review of the concepts of duration models can be found 
elsewhere.14   What follows is a brief summary of the basics and terminology required 
to present the proposed empirical model. Suppose one is concerned with a random 
variable t, the time until an event, and one wishes to know the influence of specific 
covariates x on t. An application of least squares to this type of problem suffers from 
three major problems – it requires data aggregation that will drop time varying 
covariates, it cannot handle censored observations (observations that do not 
experience the ‘event’), and it might predict meaningless negative durations (event 
occurrence before time zero).  
Duration models were developed to address these limitations. Observations 
(spells) are realizations of an underlying random process which can be characterized 
by the probability density function (pdf) 
)Pr()( dttTttf +<≤=   





≤== ∫ , 0≥t , 
where 0≥T denotes the duration until failure and t denotes a particular value of T. By 
assuming f(t) has only nonnegative support eliminates the possibility of negative time 
durations.  
                                                 




The survival function, S(t)=1-F(t), is the complement of the cumulative 
distribution function (cdf) and is the mathematical representation of the likelihood of 
surviving until time t. Thus S(t)= )Pr( tT > . The survival function serves as the 
contribution to the likelihood function for observations that do not fail during the time 
under study. These observations are called ‘right-censored’ in the literature. 
Observations that “fail” contribute the value of their pdf to the likelihood function.  
There are two additional functions of interest: the hazard function, )(tλ , and 
the integrated hazard, Λ(t). The hazard function is the instantaneous probability of 
failure in the interval dt assuming survival up to time t:  






tTdttTtt =≥+<≤=λ . 
The discrete analog to (7) is 
















)()( λ  and is the total accumulated risk an 
individual has been exposed to by time t.15   
To facilitate estimation, it is necessary to incorporate covariates. This is 
typically accomplished by specifying the individual hazard as 
(9)    )()()( 0 Xtti κλλ = , 
where )(xκ is the systematic part typically specified as exp[Xi β ] and )(0 tλ is the 
baseline hazard common to all observations. This general form is called the 
proportional hazards specification because the effect of covariates is to shift the 
                                                 
15 It is easily shown that S(t)=exp[ )(tΛ− ] . That is, the survival function is directly related to the 




hazard proportionally. It is, by far, the most popular model utilized in the hazard 
literature. Since duration models do not aggregate data across time, incorporating 
time varying covariates in this framework is straightforward.  
The most common approach to estimation is maximum likelihood. 
Observations are divided into two groups: observed failures and censored 
observations. As observed failures enter the hazard via their probability density 
functions and censored observations enter through their survival functions, the 









Xi is observation i’s vector of observed covariates and di is an indicator variable equal 
to 1 if the ith observation fails during the study period and 0 if the observation is right-
censored. From this formula, it is easy to see how hazard models utilize information 
from censored observations via the likelihood contribution of the survival function. 
This formula ignores the possibility of time varying covariates. Including them 
amounts to adding ‘spells’ to the data, where a ‘spell’ is defined as an interval of time 
and the associated quantities relevant to each observation during that interval. That is, 
an observation will contribute multiple spells of data, one for each time interval over 
which covariates remain constant.16     
There are important explicit assumptions involved in estimating a traditional 
hazard model, most noticeably the choice of baseline hazard specification. The next 
section describes an array of hazard models which will be utilized to select the final 
                                                 
16 One should estimate standard errors using appropriate robust techniques that drop the independence 




form of the dependent competing risks. This discussion will begin by concentrating 
on the parametric assumptions involved in estimating hazard models and the pros and 
cons of imposing various parametric assumptions. These techniques will be utilized 
during estimation to impose necessary restrictions on the general competing risks 
model which will be introduced at the end of this chapter. First the specification of 
the baseline hazard, )(0 tλ , will need to be determined. Then unobserved heterogeneity 
will be incorporated. Last the dependent competing risks model can be estimated 
imposing the necessary distributional assumptions. 
3.1.1  Parametric Baseline Models 
 
If strong prior theoretical or empirical grounds exist to imply a particular form 
for the baseline hazard, a parametric function for )(0 tλ can be imposed. By imposing 
a particular baseline hazard specification the researcher is restricting the shape of the 
baseline hazard and may even impose a specific form of duration dependence. 
Duration dependency is best thought of as the shared, or baseline, probability of 
failure for the members of the dataset in response to the passage of time. Specifically, 
if the longer one survives without failure implies a lower probability of failure for the 
next time interval then the duration dependency is negative. However, if a similarly 
lengthy survival implies a high probability of failure in the next time interval then the 
duration dependency is positive. Examples of negative duration dependency include 
infant mortality or post operative infection because the longer an infant survives 
outside the womb the more likely they are to survive to the toddler stage and in many 
cases the probability of post operative infection declines with the passage of time 




of a mechanical object because as we age our probability of survival decreases and 
similarly a mechanical object, such as a light bulb or a mechanical gear, has a higher 
probability of failure as time passes.17     
Among the class of proportional hazards, the most popular specification for 
the baseline is the Weibull, ,)( 10
−= ppttλ  characterized by a monotonically 
decreasing or increasing hazard rate with one shape parameter, p. A Gompertz 
baseline hazard, )exp()(0 ptt =λ , also allows for monotonic duration dependency 
while an exponential baseline, 1)(0 =tλ  , produces a “memory-less” hazard which 
has no dependency on time and obviously no additional parameters to estimate.18  
Specification of a parametric baseline hazard allows for more efficient estimation and 
prediction of survival times for censored parcels in the analysis.  
Unfortunately, in this application there is no reason to assume a form of 
duration dependency. Duration dependence can be expected to be negative if, as time 
progresses, observations remaining in the risk set are less and less likely to ‘fail’. 
There is at least one reason why this might characterize the land use conversion case. 
Parcels that develop early will tend to have attributes with high development value. 
Thus the composition of the risk set will be changing over time, with an increasing 
proportion characterized by attributes with less desirable attributes for development. 
This phenomenon suggests negative duration dependence. However market pressures 
may conceal or mitigate this negative effect. As the supply of developable parcels 
                                                 
17 Duration dependency can also exhibit a minimum, a bathtub shape, or a maximum, a humped shape, 
but these models are not proportional hazard models and can be estimated with semi-parametric 
proportional hazards. 
18 The exponential is so named because the covariates are incorporated using an exponential and the 




decreases, the rising returns to conversion of remaining land may mitigate the 
negative effects of declining quality. Because of these countervailing forces there is 
no strong theoretical reason to expect a specific shape of the baseline hazard or to 
expect the baseline to be monotonically increasing or decreasing throughout the study 
period. However, semi-parametric proportional hazard specifications allow the 
baseline hazard to take any shape without restriction. The next section explains how 
these models are estimated. 
3.1.2 Semi-Parametric Baseline Models 
 
If theory offers no insight about the shape of the baseline hazard, a safe 
approach is to allow semi or non parametric estimation of this function. A semi-
parametric method to accomplish this uses a piecewise exponential baseline hazard 
specification. In this case the baseline is allowed to vary freely from one time interval 
to another but is constant across observations within time intervals. The piece-wise 








0 δλ  where 1=mδ  for mm ata <≤−1  and = 0 otherwise. 
 
In (11), the ma ’s represent a series of temporal breakpoints, and the hm’s represent the 
baseline hazard rates in each of the m intervals. The breakpoints can be set such that 
0λ  follows the periodicity of the data or partitioned such that an equal number of 
failures occur in each period. The key weakness of this specification is the lack of 




in a non-systematic way over time, there is no way of predicting future outcomes that 
is not heavily influenced by the value of the hm in the last defined period.  
3.1.3 Non-Parametric Baseline Model 
 
If one is interested only in the impacts of covariates, a method developed by 
Cox (1959) using a partial likelihood approach is appropriate. The common baseline 
hazard is treated as a nuisance parameter and factored out of the likelihood function. 
To see this, note that for any two observations, i and j, 

















and the baseline hazard, being the same for everyone, cancels out. Estimation is 
accomplished using the ‘partial’ likelihood function, where the term ‘partial’ denotes 
the fact that estimation of the baseline is not attempted. This method is based on the 
assumption that the intervals between successive duration times (failure times) 
contributes no information regarding the relationship between the covariates and the 
hazard rate (Collett, 1994). It is the order of the failure times, not the interval between 
failure times, which contributes information to the partial likelihood function.  
Consider a data set in which there are N observations of which Nf fail during 
the study period and N-Nf are censored. The likelihood function for the Cox model is 
the product of Nf terms – one for each failure, in which the contribution of the i
th 
failure is given by: 




















where ti is defined as the time period of the i
th failure and R(ti) is the set of all 
observations still at risk at time ti. Expression 13 is the probability that, given that a 
failure occurs in period ti, it is the observation i among the set of observations still at 
risk that is the one that fails. Taking the product of these conditional probabilities 
yields the partial likelihood function: 

























where di=1 if the observation is uncensored and di=0 if it is right-censored (i.e. the 
observation does not ‘fail’ during the study period and remains in the risk set). This is 
a conditional logit likelihood function, often referred to as a fixed effects model, 
where the “effect” that is “fixed” is the risk period. Note that the likelihood function 
does not include an explicit term for the censored observations, although they are 
represented repeatedly in the denominator as they remain in the risk set throughout.  
If the data have many ‘ties’, in the sense that multiple observations fail in the 
same time period, then problems arise in composing the risk set, as it is typically 
impossible to know which observation failed first. There are methods to handle ties, 
but in general when data contain many ties the Cox method should be used with 
caution. However, since the Cox model is primarily concerned with the impact of 
covariates, it provides an appealing specification test for estimation based on a 
parametric functional form of the baseline hazard. Because parametric specifications 
are usually somewhat arbitrary but necessary if simulation into the future is desirable, 
it is useful to compare parametric results to the results of the Cox model. Such a 




particular whether the imposed baseline is altering the covariate effects. It is for this 
purpose that the Cox model will be estimated.  
3.2 Unobserved Heterogeneity 
 
Despite the great detail afforded by the land use data available in Howard 
County, there are still significant unobservable individual or parcel specific factors 
that will impact the conversion or preservation decision. As mentioned in the 
previous section in order to control for heterogeneity in the observables, as it impacts 
the duration dependence, these observables are simply included in the model. 
However, heterogeneity that is not captured by the observed explanatory variables 
within the conversion hazard may imply that more desirable parcels will likely 
convert first leaving less desirable parcels in the sample longer, resulting in a length-
biased sample and potentially incorrect negative duration dependence.19  To make the 
model robust in the presence of influential unobservables, an estimation approach that 
can accommodate a distribution of unobservable “random effects” will be utilized. In 
this policy environment unobservables arise from at least two sources related to the 
parcel, through parcel attributes and landowner attributes. 
Unobservable parcel attributes include the type of activity on the parcel. In 
the dataset it is known that a parcel is in an agricultural use but there is no knowledge 
of the type of agricultural activity.20  It would be logical that certain farm types are 
more likely to enroll in a preservation program while simultaneously less likely to 
convert. For example, vegetable and equine operations might be more apt to preserve 
                                                 
19 The length-bias sample issue is prevalent in stock samples. These data are a stock sample because 
developable land is not added during the study period. 




than soybean/corn or forestry operations, possibly because the former are more 
profitable in Maryland than the latter. Other unobservable but important attributes 
might include aesthetic characteristics such as elevations with views that might make 
a parcel more valuable in housing and thus prone to conversion. There may also be 
unobservable parcel attributes that affect both preservation and development 
likelihoods, such as drainage problems or odd parcel shapes. These factors may 
preclude parcels from receiving high scores by preservation authorities and make 
them unlikely candidates for conversion as well. 
Unobservable landowner attributes will also affect the hazards of 
development and/or preservation. Landowners with intensive investment in the 
operation may be less inclined to convert because of sunk investment costs, but these 
same parcels might be more inclined to protect their investment by enrolling in an 
easement program. Landowners close to retirement age may tend to develop while 
those in need of cash to pay off farm debt or send children to college may be more 
likely to develop or preserve relative to the status quo. All of these individual 
landowner attributes potentially impact the duration variables of interest but are not 
available in most land use datasets. Models that fail to account for the influence of 
unobserved heterogeneity can lead to inconsistent estimates, incorrect standard errors, 
and misleading inference concerning duration dependence, all of which will be 






3.2.1 Incorporating Unobserved Heterogeneity 
 
In univariate (single risk) duration models, unobserved heterogeneity arises 
because of the inability of a researcher to obtain all the relevant covariates that govern 
the duration under study. Unobserved heterogeneity can lead to problematic inference 
from inconsistent parameter estimates, incorrect standard errors, and misleading 
estimates of duration dependence. Concerning duration dependence, the most serious 
problem is this: unobserved heterogeneity tends to produce estimated hazard 
functions that decline in time, even when the true hazard is not declining for any 
individual in the sample (Allison, 1997).  
Lancaster (1990) and Kalbfeisch and Prentice (1980) discuss issues 
surrounding unobserved heterogeneity and suggest that a parametric distribution be 
multiplicatively included in the proportional hazards specification as a potential 
modeling solution: 
(15)    iii Xtt υβλλ )exp()()( 0= . 
In duration models iυ is often called “frailty”, although iυ  is more familiarly 
recognized as a random effect (see Nickell (1979), Flinn and Heckman (1982) for 
implementations). Models that specify a parametric baseline and a parametric frailty 
are called mixture models because the “error” is essentially a mixture of two 
distributions. The “frailty” term is drawn from a distribution with density )(υg  and is 




effect is a contentious and perhaps heroic assumption, because of this assumption of 
zero correlation between the random effect and the observed covariates. In panel data 
models the uncorrelated nature of the random effect is testable, but in single spell 
duration data it is not (Heckman and Singer, 1982).21   
If one is willing to assume a distribution for the individual frailty parameter, 
estimation of these models amounts to estimation of one (or more) additional 
parameters describing the frailty distribution (see Klein and Moeschberger, 1997, or 
Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 1997, for overviews). Log normal distributions are 
often used such that );()( θυυ gg = is distributed log normal with a unit mean, 
necessary for identification, and a variance, θ .22   This approach allows one to test 
the hypothesis that 0=θ , which suggests no undue influence of unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
Heckman and Singer (1984) is an often cited work for the nonparametric 
inclusion of unobserved heterogeneity in the duration model. They show that 
including parametric heterogeneity is potentially too limiting and prove that in the 
class of mixed proportional hazard models the nonparametric (maximum likelihood) 
estimator of the heterogeneity distribution is a discrete one. Their results illustrate the 
flexibility of discrete distributions to mimic a wide range of mixture duration 
distributions (van den Berg, Lindeboom, and Ridder, 1994). In applications where a 
fixed number of supports are used, the locations and population proportions at each 
                                                 
21 However, with the addition of time varying covariates which effectively induces a panel dataset, a 
Hausman test might be applicable, though not currently established. 
22 Other distributions include t, inverse Gaussian, Gamma, and power variance model. Technically, any 




support are estimated jointly. The number of supports should increase as the data 
allow (Gritz, 1993; Ham and LaLonde, 1996).  
  On the other hand, Han and Hausman suggest that the non-parametric 
unobserved heterogeneity estimation proposed by Heckman and Singer is not 
completely necessary. The results from Heckman and Singer, and similar results from 
Honore (1990), are derived from a model with a parametric baseline hazard and non-
parametric unobserved heterogeneity. In contrast, Han and Hausman impose a gamma 
distribution for the unobserved heterogeneity and a semi-parametric piecewise 
exponential baseline hazard suggested by Meyer (1986) and conclude that the non-
parametric unobserved heterogeneity is not necessary. As with the specification of the 
baseline hazard the specification of a distribution for unobserved heterogeneity 
should be tested against the least parametric approach available, in this case the finite 
mixture distribution, as validation that the imposed distributional assumptions are not 
influencing the estimated results. 
3.3 Non-random censoring / multi-state models 
 
To this point univariate hazard models have been assumed, i.e. models with 
one exit state – either development or preservation. An obvious extension, and a 
necessary one for this analysis, allows for multiple exit states. Examples of multiple 
hazards from the general hazard literature include exit from an unemployment spell to 
a part time or full time job, and exit from a healthy state to diabetes and/or heart 




enrolling in the preservation program or by converting to development, and both 
possibilities need to be explicitly taken into account.  
It is possible, even within the context of a univariate model, for observations 
to exit the sample by means other than the failure event under study.  Thinning of the 
sample through time for reasons unrelated to the exit event of interest is called panel 
attrition. The univariate model will continue to be a valid one if the incidental exits 
are independent of the modeled failure event. This independence assumption is 
commonly called random censoring or non-informative censoring in the literature. 
Independence is conditional on observed covariates and is an implicit assumption of 
all univariate hazard analyses.23   
Applying a univariate model can lead to misleading results when exit to 
another state is not an independent process. The unemployment example provides a 
clear violation of this assumption. If unobserved ability influences exits to part time 
work or school then the processes are not independent of the failure event of interest:  
full time employment. The land conversion decision in the presence of a preservation 
program is another good example of potentially dependent exit states. There is no 
reason to assume that exit to preservation is independent of the development decision, 
even when conditioned on observables. For one thing, landowners whose 
circumstances require them to liquidate assets are more likely either to develop or 
preserve than to remain in the status quo state. 
With multiple states, the hazard model must be reframed. For each 
observation, i, a draw from the latent K-dimensional distribution may be represented 
                                                 
23 This is the hazard model’s version of the conditional independence assumption. If a researcher can 
identify and measure the underlying risk factors that produce the dependency, then accounting for 




as a Kx1 vector Ti, where K is the number of possible exit states  Each element in this 
vector, Tki, is an exit time and each k is an exit state. In some applications the entire 
vector may be observable which implies the exit into one state does not preclude exits 
into a second, third, or Kth state. Based on the statistical nomenclature, ‘competing 
risks’ models are a subset of these more general models.  
In the competing risks models, exits are mutually exclusive. The best 
example, though slightly morbid, is the exit from a post-operative state. One might 
observe patient i’s death from an infection, but this patient was at risk from a myriad 
of other sources (e.g. heart disease, cancer), only one of which could kill him. This 
analysis falls into the competing risks models because exits to preservation are 
precluded from conversion and conversion exits cannot subsequently enroll in the 
preservation program.24  Given that the nature of the land use problem is one in which 
only two alternative exit states exist, the remaining discussion is presented assuming 
two mutually exclusive states. 
When exit states are mutually exclusive, the entire distribution of survival 
times, S(t1, t2), is not observable. As a consequence competing risk models are 
considered latent variable models. The researcher observes T = min(T1, T2) along 
with the cause of failure outcome, O. The data (T, O) are referred to as the identified 
minimum. In the absence of regressors the joint distribution (T1, T2) is not identified 
by (T, O) (Cox, 1959, 1962; Tsiatis, 1975). In particular, for any joint distribution of 
dependent failure times there is a joint distribution of independent failure times that 
                                                 
24 Although both reversals are technically possible it is unlikely a housing development will revert to 




will produce the same identified minimum.25  Because it was believed that all 
dependent competing risks models were unidentified, it was common practice to 
assume independence for estimation (Gordon, 2002). However, erroneously assuming 
independence leads to incorrect inference. In addition, the fact that durations, Tk k=1, 
2, are related is often an important issue in its own right. Generally, independence 
does not make sense if individual behavior influences the decision to enter multiple 
end states.  
Identification with regressors was first established by Heckman and Honore 
(1989) they proved that models with dependent risks are identified if there is 
sufficient variation in the latent failure times with regressors. Abbring and van den 
Berg (2003) prove identification for a class of slightly more restrictive but more 
popular models called mixed proportional hazard (MPH) models. By focusing on 
MPH models the authors impose fewer restrictions on the domain of the covariates, 
X. Loosely speaking, X must have two continuous variables that are not perfectly 
collinear and that act differently on each hazard in the two-risk world (van den Berg, 
2005).  
The general specification for a MPH competing risks model with unobserved 
heterogeneity is 














ω is the baseline hazard associated with each risk. Each risk is modeled as 
a mixed proportional hazard where V is unobserved. For each risk the composition of 
survivors changes selectively with time, as the more ‘frail’ exit quicker than the ‘less 
                                                 




frail’ via the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity, so identification from (T | X) is 
non-trivial and is not always possible. Assuming independence implies that (T1, T2|X) 
are independent and is equivalent to running two univariate hazards - one for the 
preservation risk and one for the conversion risk. Allowing for dependence then 
implies that (T1,T2|X,V) are independent where the end states exhibit dependence 
through the distribution of V1 and V2 , not directly through X.  
Van den Berg (2005) gives an intuitive summary of the identification results 
which are paraphrased here. Assuming at least two continuous regressors, one can 
manipulate exp(x’β1) while keeping exp(x’β2) constant. If (T1, T2|X) are independent 
then the observable hazard rate of T2 at t>0 given T1≥t does not vary with changes in 
exp(x’β1). However, the MPH model presented in (16) allows for dependence of (T1, 
T2|X) via the unobservables. For example, changes in exp(x’β1) change the 
distribution of the unobservable V1 among survivors at time t due to the fact that X 
and V are dependent conditional on survival T1 ≥ t > 0 even though they are 
independent unconditionally.26  Now if V1 and V2 are dependent this change affects 
the distribution of V2 among the survivors at t which in turn affects the hazard of T2 at 
t given T1>t, i.e. the observation has not exited via the first exit pathway. Thus the 
variation in T1 with exp(x’β1) for a given exp(x’β2) is informative on the dependence 
of the durations.  In the most flexible competing risks model the unobservables are 
serving two functions. They allow for dependency across risks, and they control for 
the inherent selection problem due to unobserved heterogeneity within each risk. 
                                                 





To summarize, the dependent competing risks models, though first thought to 
be unidentified, have subsequently been proven identified by including regressors 
with varying restrictions on covariates depending on the class of model. This 
dissertation will utilize the mixed proportional hazard model discussed in detail by 
Abbring and van den Berg (2003) and van den Berg (2005) and rely on identification 
from the continuous variables in the model which will be discussed in detail in the 
next chapter. Additionally, in the next section, which presents the full model, a 
potential exclusion restriction will be illustrated even though exclusion restrictions 
are not necessary in this class of models. None of the identification results presented 
above require such an exclusion restriction as the same set of covariates can be 
allowed to affect both durations.  
As one can see from this introduction to the necessary components of a 
competing risks hazard model implementation, there are many issues and 
distributional decisions to make in constructing a general, theoretically consistent 
model to estimate land conversion decision with multiple exit states.  
3.4  A Land Use Application of the Competing Risks Model  
 
Utilizing data on the timing of preservation, Tp, and the timing of conversion, 
Tc, combined with parcel attributes, X, the proposed hypotheses, preservation 
qualification’s influence on development decisions, will be tested and the size of any 
effect can be estimated. This work closely follows Lillard (1993), Fallick and Ryu 




van den Berg (2003). However it is the first such implementation in a land use 
context.   
The hazard for the preservation rate as given by 
  (17)   ( ) ppppp vzXXItvzXt 'exp)()(),,|( 0 αβλλ +=   
where I(X) is an indicator function that equals 1 if the parcel is known to be eligible 
for the preservation program as defined by eligibility criteria and characteristics of the 
parcel, )(0 t
pλ is the baseline hazard of preservation, and ),,|( p
p vzXtλ is the 
instantaneous hazard rate. Covariates in X include parcel attributes and locational 
attributes of surrounding land use. The covariate z is a dummy variable equal to one 
in the years the program was funded and zero otherwise. Finally the parameter pv  in 
(17) is the parameter representing unobserved heterogeneity in the preservation 
hazard process.  
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where X  includes all variables in common with the preservation hazard, Y includes 
variables expected to influence the conversion hazard through conversion costs or 
development pressures, including the options variables described in the theoretical 
model, and cv  is the unobserved heterogeneity parameter specific to the conversion 
hazard. Variables included in X and Y can, and do, change across time. However the 
unobservable parameters, pv  and cv  
, are observation-specific and not time-specific. 
As has been true throughout, time subscripts are omitted to reduce notational 




In the competing risks framework these hazard rates will be jointly estimated. 
The funding dummy present in the preservation hazard should impact the 
preservation decision but not the conversion decision directly and thus acts as an 
exclusion restriction. In a similar framework, Fallick and Ryu (2003) argue that a 
term such as I(X) serves as an additional exclusion restriction because the eligibility 
criteria is forced to have a larger impact on the preservation hazard due to prior 
knowledge of the world. The specification implies eligible parcels can be delineated a 
priori using observable covariates. In this case the preservation eligibility criteria are 
well documented by the county and involve observable data.  
The system of equations in log form is rewritten as 




















where the baseline hazards )(0 t
cλ and )(0 t
pλ  are replaced by functions of time, 
)('0 tH cβ and )('0 tH pϕ , which can be estimated parametrically, by defining Hi(t), or 
non-parametrically. Parametric estimation involves using a distributional assumption 
on the baseline hazard, and non-parametric estimation is most often accomplished via 
a piecewise linear baseline suggested by Han and Hausman.27  Selection of these 
distributional assumptions will be described in the next section. To estimate the 
dependent competing risks model the parameters pv  and cv  are allowed to be 
correlated and estimate the correlation parameter, 
pcvv
ρ , jointly in the model.  
                                                 
27
 In fact, Han and Hausman suggest that non-parametrically estimating the baseline hazard absorbs 
some variation being picked up by the unobserved heterogeneity term in Heckman and Singer. They 
argue that the restrictive parametric baseline hazard imposed by Heckman and Singer is a contributing 
factor in the finding of influential unobserved heterogeneity. This suggests a potential tradeoff between 




   To compose the likelihood function there are three cases to consider—the 
parcel converts, the parcel preserves, or the parcel does not change status.  
i.) The contribution to the likelihood function for parcels that convert, where t is the 
conversion period, is given by the following28: 
[ ]),,,,|1,1Pr()1,1Pr( , pcpcvvpc vvzYXtTtTtEtTtTt pc −>≤<−=−>≤<− ; 
ii.) the contributions for parcels that preserve (where t is the period in which the 
preservation takes place) is: 
)],,,,|1,1[Pr()1,1Pr( , pccpvvcp vvzYXtTtTtEtTtTt pc −>≤<−=−>≤<−  
iii.) and the contribution for parcels that remain in the current state for the duration of 
the study period is: 
)],,,,|,[Pr(),Pr( , pccpvvcp vvzYXtTtTEtTtT pc >>=>> , 
where E is the expectation operator.  
















),,|(),,|( λ . 
Assuming variables in X, Y, and z are constant within each year of the data, even 
though they may vary across years, these integrations reduce to the summations, 29 
 
                                                 
28 Technically the probability )1,1Pr( −>≤<− tTtTt pc  is an approximation of the true probability, 
),1Pr( cpc TTtTt >≤<− . This approximation is used because the true probability, which is the 
probability of receiving a preservation and a conversion offer in the same year, is quite involved to 
compute and would be a rare occurrence.  
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The survivor function is equal to the exponentiated negative integrated hazard,  so 
















Now if conditional independence based on the observed data and inclusion of 
unobservables in the model is assumed, the probabilities i. through iii. can be 
rewritten as 
   i΄)  
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Since the realization of (vc, vp) is not observed the expectation of these 
quantities must be taken with respect to the stochastic nature of (vc, vp). In the hazard 
literature this is accomplished by making a parametric assumption or using a bivariate 
discrete distribution following Heckman and Singer. For this presentation, bivariate 
normal distribution is assumed to estimate the competing risks model.30 
                                                 






















































σσρσ = . 
This assumption requires the data to be modeled as continuous data which is often 
done in hazard models if the distribution of failures within the discrete step is not 
important to the analysis. In this dissertation information on the month of conversion 
will be used and continuity assumed, so this assumption is not overly restrictive.  
Embedded in this model is the assumption that, conditional on the unobserved 
heterogeneity, the marginal density functions for the failure times are independent. 
Defining the term )(tχ as representing the covariate paths of z, Y, and X from the 







i vtztXtvttSvttf λχχ =  







i vtYtXtvttSvttf λχχ =  
for a parcel that converts. Given this conditional independence, censored parcels 






i vttSvttS χχ . 
The likelihood function in this case is 






















n dvdvvvfvttSvttS ),()),(,()),(,( χχ∗                      
where 1=pnδ  if the parcel preserves and 1=cnδ if the parcel converts. The term 
),( cp vvf  is the pdf of the bivariate frailty distribution. This parameterization of the 
frailty distribution requires numerical integration to compute the likelihood function. 
This framework allows the impact of covariates to be measured in the time dimension 
and in the presence of the preservation program where the preservation exit is 
modeled explicitly and can influence the outcome of the conversion hazard. That is, 
the decision to exit the risk set by preserving the parcel is not assumed to be simply a 
case of random censoring. Estimation for these complex models is accomplished 
using aML, statistical software specifically designed to estimate correlated outcomes 
and joint models (Lillard and Panis, 2003). 
This general competing risks model addresses both unobserved heterogeneity 
and non-random censoring and can be very general. However a parametric 
assumption is still required for the baseline hazard and the heterogeneity parameters 
to facilitate estimation. The next section will describe the data used in the model and 
in subsequent chapter will illustrate the various methods to inform selection of the 







4. Data  
 
4.1 Risk Set and Outcome Variables 
 
The data for this study include all parcels in Howard County, Maryland that, 
as of the end of 1990, were eligible to be subdivided into at least three new housing 
lots. The latter criterion avoids counting the development of family lots as a 
conversion of farmland to residential use. The process by which these parcels were 
identified was quite complex and included two components. The first component 
involved identifying all actual subdivision activity during the study period and the 
second required classifying parcels that had not been developed during the study 
period as either potentially ‘developable’ or not developable.  
The process of identifying subdivisions began with an examination of a series 
of snapshots (taken in 1993, 1995, 1997 and 2001) of the tax assessment data base for 
Howard County for clues that would link disappearing parcels with newly appearing 
housing lots. A variable called a ‘record creation date’ became a key feature of the 
investigation, as it is this variable that helps establish the date (month and year) at 
which an identified parcel subdivision took place. Because the record creation date 
variable was not included in the data base prior to 1991, the study period must begin 
at that point. Prior subdivisions are identifiable, but their conversion dates are not 
known with precision. 
Subsequent to this initial investigation using the non-spatial tax assessment 




available, including the digitized boundaries of parcels and account identifiers that 
linked to tax assessment data base attributes. This new data source allowed a means 
to check and correct prior subdivision assignments. It also provided digitized 
boundaries of all parcels that made up the final observation set. A second source of 
subdivision data came directly from the Howard County planners office which 
included the actual county database used to track large subdivisions from application 
to approval. Though this list was not geocoded or well-organized, some account 
identifiers facilitated cross-checking of previous subdivision assignments. The final 
product of this first component was a map of subdivision activity that took place 
between 1991 and 2001, including the boundaries of the final housing lots and the 
reconstructed boundaries of the original pre-subdivision parcels. 
Once the actually developed parcels had been identified, all potentially 
developable parcels had to be added to the observation set. These were defined using 
attribute data for the parcel and existing zoning regulations. Undeveloped parcels 
eligible for inclusion in the observation set were those zoned in a way that allowed 
for residential development and those with capacity for at least three additional 
housing units, given maximum density regulations applicable to the parcel.  Parcels 
with existing houses were included as long as they met this criterion. Zoning criteria 
were obtained from Howard County’s 1992 zoning ordinance. The zoning categories 
relevant to each parcel were determined from the tax assessment data base and, where 
missing, from the digitized zoning map available from the Maryland Department of 
Planning.31 
                                                 




Further eliminations were made from this initial set. Included in these 
deletions was land preserved through preservation or conservation activity prior to 
1991, as well as wildlife sanctuaries, parks and other prior public acquisitions. Parcels 
were also deleted from the observation set if their shape precluded reasonable 
subdivision. The resulting dataset represents the county landscape as of 1990 and the 
conversion history from 1991 to 2001. The conversion (failure) time is defined as the 
date the lots of a subdivision were recorded. In the case where a parcel converted but 
left a portion of land large enough to be further subdivided this portion is redefined as 
a new parcel and remains in the risk set.  
While all parcels eligible for preservation must also be developable, not all 
potentially developable parcels had the option to preserve, only those meeting quite 
specific eligibility criteria. Because the 100 minimum acre limit was relaxed for 
parcels adjacent to already preserved or protected land, smaller parcels that became 
eligible as adjoining parcels were preserved were added to the eligibility pool during 
the study period where appropriate.  
The final data set includes 1,756 parcels totaling 43,300 acres. The 
distribution of these parcels is displayed in Figure 4.1. Of these parcels 258 were 
eligible for preservation at some time during the study period and 59 enrolled in the 
preservation program. Each of these sets of parcels is shown in Figure 4.2. The 
distribution of the 463 subdivided parcels is shown in Figure 4.3. Of the subdivided 
parcels in the final data set, 57 were eligible to preserve which illustrates the 




data set represents a unique and rich view of the land conversion process across space 





















4.2 Explanatory Variables 
 
Data to populate the X and Y vectors for the model developed in Chapter 3 
were obtained from a number of sources. Variables pertaining to the X and Y vectors 
for the development risk will be discussed first followed by a discussion of the X 
vector for the preservation risk. 
Consistent with the story presented in earlier chapters, factors that vary over 
parcels and are expected to shift the hazard of development include characteristics 
that make the location more or less desirable for residential use, those that affect 
agricultural productivity (and thus opportunity costs), and those that cause some 
parcels to be developable at lower cost. Within the first category, arguably the most 
commonly considered are commuting costs to major employment centers – 
Baltimore, MD (distBA) and Washington, D.C. (distDC). These distances were 
measured from the centroid of each parcel in the observation set, along the county 
roads network, to the centroid of each of the two cities using ARC/INFO software. 
The geocoded roads network used is a product of the Maryland Department of 
Transportation. 
If surrounding land use has an effect on the value of a parcel in a given land 
use, then it follows that surrounding land use will also have an effect on the 
likelihood of a parcel being developed. In the presence of such interaction effects, 
policies that alter development decisions can alter the likelihood of development of 
parcels other than those directly affected by the policy. Simply stated surrounding 




what is near to their house. People select homes based, in part, on the surroundings. 
Some prefer forests while others parks, and some prefer to live in densely populated 
areas, while others prefer less congestion. Additionally, the existence of interactions 
among neighboring parcels leads logically to path dependence in land use pattern 
change. For these reasons measures of the surrounding land uses are included as 
variables in the hazard model to control for these interaction effects with neighboring 
parcels.  
In measuring the surrounding land use variables, land uses are aggregated into 
ten categories: developable land with an existing house (e.g. a farmstead) 
(sluDevWithHs), developable land without an existing house (sluDevNoHs), 
commercial/industrial/institutional use (sluComm), subdivided land (but not yet built 
on) (sluSubdiv), preserved land (sluPreserved), private not developable openspace 
(sluOpen), roads (sluRoad), protected land (e.g. publicly supplied open space) 
(sluProtected), and “fully developed” land in residential use (the normalized 
category). The surrounding land use measures are calculated as percentages of land 
within a 100 meter buffer around the true boundary of each parcel and are calculated 
using the parcel boundary GIS data from Howard County, reconstructed to reflect 
land uses in each year. Land use designations are assigned to each parcel in Howard 
County based on parcel attribute data, largely from the tax assessment data base. 
Specifically, the existence of structures and their date of construction can be 
determined from the Howard County GIS layers and from the Tax Assessment 
database (TA). Residential uses are designated by the TA’s land use code and by 




land uses are further categorized based on the TA’s land use code and TA variables 
describing the specific use of properties that are commercial or tax exempt at a highly 
refined level. As examples, exempt classes include schools, churches, government 
office buildings, public works operations, etc. Commercial and industrial uses include 
retail stores, manufacturing plants, warehouses, office buildings, etc. 
Although surrounding land use results are sensitive to the use of larger radii, 
e.g. 400 and 800 meters, estimated coefficients associated with the main variables of 
interest in the models turn out not to be sensitive to the buffer size. The surrounding 
land use measures are updated in each analysis year as neighboring parcels are 
converted, preserved, or built upon.  
Each parcel in the risk set is assigned to a Census block group and tract by 
overlaying the 1990 Census maps on the parcel boundary map. Where parcels overlap 
Census areas, the area with the largest share of the parcel is assigned. Two variables 
are then constructed using the Census boundaries. First, by overlaying the recent sales 
data from the Howard County tax assessment database on the Census block group 
map a spatially distinct variable for recent construction activity (devRate) is 
constructed. This variable is calculated as the percentage increase in housing stock by 
Census block group from the previous year and is included to capture the influence of 
recent construction activity.32  The recent construction activity serves at least two 
purposes – a) it picks up some desirability not fully measured by the distance or 
surrounding land use attributes and b) it proxies for areas of the county into which the 
planners’ office may be attempting to funnel new development. The second Census 
                                                 





related variable is the density of housing (popDen), measured as number of housing 
units per acre at the Census tract level and included to proxy for congestion and other 
amenities/disamenities of the landscape that are correlated with density of residential 
housing at a larger spatial scale than the immediate neighborhood. 
To proxy for construction costs a measure of parcel slope (steep), the 
percentage of the parcel with a slope greater than 15%, is calculated from the natural 
soils maps from NRCS. Steep sloped parcels are less likely to be suitable land for 
agriculture. The impact on development is unknown because steep slopes may proxy 
for parcels with scenic views, but steep slopes increase construction costs and can 
invoke erosion control regulations. Other construction related variables are obtained 
from the site development engineering tables of the Soil Survey Geographic Database 
(SSURGO) from NRCS. These are the road suitability (notRoadSuit) and septic 
suitability (notSepticSuit) variables where both are represented in the dataset as 
percentage of the parcel in the “very limited” category. The classifications combine 
data on soil type, slope, permeability, bedrock depth, saturated zone depth, and frost 
action to estimate these construction indices.  
The 1990 Maryland Department of Planning (MDP) maps provide data for the 
percentage of each parcel’s land cover in forest (forested) and agricultural 
(agriculture) use. Agriculture is defined as field, forage, or row crops and forest cover 
as deciduous, evergreen, or mixed forest. The status of sewer construction 
(sewerPlnd) is also available from MDP data and is coded as a dummy variable equal 
to one if sewer service does not exist but is planned for the near future. The variable 




Assessment database. The variables is set equal to one for parcels with an existing 
house, with updating taking place each year of the analysis to reflect new home 
construction. This variable for existence of a house is expected to negatively 
influence the conversion decision, particularly for small parcels, due to the 
unobserved location of the house on the parcel. For example, a parcel that can yield 3 
additional units based on acreage and zoning is included in the dataset, but if there is 
an existing house and it is located centrally on the parcel may not be possible to add 
three new housing units without removing the existing structure. Additionally, parcel 
owners who live on their property have recreational and aesthetic uses for their land 
and thus may be less likely to subdivide than owners who do not live on their parcels. 
The final ‘construction cost’ variable is the 3 month Treasury bill rate (intRate), 
included as an indicator of the cost of carrying the land from the time the 
development process is initiated until the lots are sold. This last variable varies only 
over time but not across observations. 
A number of regulations affect various aspects of the above factors. These 
regulations are treated as exogenous, given that the Howard County Comprehensive 
Plan and zoning codes were passed in 1990 and remained static through the study 
period. The effects of zoning are measured by the number of lots that the parcel can 
be divided into (numLots) and the existence of open space set-aside requirements 
(reqOpenSpace). Finally, in a few planning areas in the county, development activity 
was capped by adequate public facilities moratoria in some of the study period years. 
The variable (Apfo) equals zero or one, respectively, for any year in which the parcel 




to school capacity for none or any part of the year. This variable is updated as 
adequate public facilities moratoria are introduced and phased out. The Apfo data are 
compiled using legislative records and a subdivision tracking database from the 
Howard County Planning Department. 
To capture the effect of returns in an agricultural use on the hazard of 
development, the percent of the parcel in each of four soil quality classes (classes 1 
through 4) from the land capability class (LCC) are included. LCC is a composite 
index from USDA representing many factors such as slope, soil type and others that 
are important to the suitability of land for agricultural use. The effect of these 
variables is measured relative to the worst soils for agriculture (the excluded soil 
category). Although the soil classifications are intended to proxy for potential 
agricultural returns, good agricultural soils can also be favorable soils for 
development, so the expected effect on the hazard rate is ambiguous. Another 
measure relating to agricultural returns is parcel size (acres and acres2). The likely 
effect this has on the hazard rate is also ambiguous, as economies of scale may be 
evident in both farming and development.  
Variables that impact preservation eligibility (the X vector) are included in the 
preservation hazard. Recall these requirements are defined by the county exogenously 
based on soil quality, acreage, viability as a farm operation, and contribution to the 
farm sector. Thus variables such as acreage (acres), agricultural or forest use 
(agriculture or forested), terrain of the parcel (steep), and soil classes (class1-4) are 




Interaction effects with surrounding land uses are expected to be prevalent in 
the preservation hazard as well as in the conversion hazard especially since many of 
the preservation requirements are enhanced or depend upon the neighboring land 
uses. It is assumed that landowners may self-select for preservation due to 
development or preservation activity on surrounding parcels, and additionally, that 
the county may choose to enroll a parcel which applies for the preservation program 
based on the activity surrounding the applying parcel, i.e. development pressures or 
agricultural uses. Thus surrounding land use measures are included in the 
preservation hazard.  
A dummy variable for the presence of an existing house is included 
(hasHouse) as is a dummy variable equal to one in years the county has funding 
(funded) for the preservation program which is the z variable described in the 
previous chapter. These years are 1991-92, 1994-96, and 2000-01. As mentioned in 
the first chapter the program exhausted forecasted funds in 1993 and again in 1997-
99. Even in the years of limited funding the program remained active and was never 
considered for cancellation.33  
The options related covariates, defined in detail in the next section, are not 
included in the preservation hazard. The compensation formula for the preservation 
option does not change during the time period and thus presents no variability to 
impact the preservation time. The full variable list is given in Table 4.1 for both the X 
and Y matrices which pertain to both the development and preservation hazards. 
Summary statistics for all the explanatory variables used in this analysis are presented 
in Table 4.2 and a detailed listing of sources is presented in Appendix B. Time 
                                                 




varying covariates are updated on a yearly schedule because it is often the case that 
exact months of changes are not available.  
 
 
Table 4.1  Variables used in Competing Risks model, by Risk (or Hazard) 
Variables Preservation Hazard Conversion Hazard 
distBA x X 
distDC x x 
sluDevWithHs x x 
sluDevNoHs x x 
sluComm x x 
sluSubdiv x x 
sluPreserved x x 
sluOpen x x 
sluRoad x x 
sluProtected x x 
sluExempt x x 
popDen  x 
numLots  x 
reqOpenSpace  x 
Funding x  
Opportunity costs 
class1 x x 
class2 x x 
class3 x x 
class4 x x 
Agriculture x x 
Acres x x 
hasHouse x x 
Conversion costs 
Steep  x 
Forested  x 
notRoadSuit  x 
notSepticSuit  x 
sewerPlanned  x 
intRate  x 
Apfo  x 
Options variables 
Drift measure  x 
Variance measure  x 









Table 4.2  Summary Statistics 




easement 0.093 0.287 0.000 1.000 
Variance 
measure* 
Standard error of 
sales price 16.751 5.695 8.022 30.909 
Drift measure* Drift in sales price 0.645 3.860 -11.025 11.831 
Returns to Development 
distBA 
Distance to 
Baltimore, in km  28.349 10.555 10.935 72.959 
distDC 
Distance to DC, in 
km 47.827 9.072 29.511 68.782 
sluDevWithHs* 
% surrounding land 
use not fully 
developed with a 
house 17.451 19.651 0 96.169 
sluDevNoHs* 
% surrounding land 
use not fully 
developed with a 
house 11.067 14.268 0 97.781 
sluComm* 
% surrounding land 
use in commercial / 
institutional 3.669 9.087 0 75.369 
sluSubdiv* 
% surrounding land 
use subdivided   3.885 6.045 0 69.353 
sluPreserved* 
% surrounding land 
use enrolled in 
preservation program 4.850 13.576 0 94.182 
sluOpen* 
% surrounding land 
use in openspace 2.676 6.987 0 93.385 
sluRoad* 
% surrounding land 
use in roads 11.028 10.904 0 71.265 
sluProtected* 
% surrounding land 
use in protected 
status 6.747 13.429 0 95.154 
sluExempt* 
% surrounding land 
use in tax exempt 





% of new 
construction added 
by block group 4.371 3.687 0 20.292 
popDen 
# households per 
acre by census tract, 
1990 .538 .458 .069 2.363 
numLots 
# lots allowed per 
zoning regs 16.637 35.492 3 700 
reqOpenSpace 
=1 if open space 
required, 0 if no .882 .322 0 1 
Opportunity Costs 
class1 
% of parcel with class 
1 soils (prime) 1.177 4.824 0 66.971 
class2 
% of parcel with class 
2 soils 44.862 31.481 0 100 
class3 
% of parcel with class 
3 soils 32.234 28.986 0 100 
class4 
% of parcel with class 
4 soils 9.597 18.515 0 100 
Agriculture % of parcel in crops 29.084 37.171 0 100 
Acres Parcel size, in acres 2.231 3.844 .751 798.465 
hasHouse 
existing house on 
parcel .640 .480 0 1 
Construction Costs 
steep 
% of parcel with 
steep slopes 16.504 31.213 0 100 
forested 
% of parcel in forest 
cover 36.695 36.650 0 100 
notRoadSuit 
% of parcel not road 
suitable 43.952 30.413 0 100 
notSepticSuit 
% of parcel not septic 
suitable 60.905 34.404 0 100 
sewerPlanned* 
Sewer planned in 
next 10 years .149 .357 0 1 
intRate* 
Annualized 3 month 
T bill rate 4.55 .901 2.998 5.820 
APFO* 
=1 if restricted by 
adequate public 
facilities moratoria  .134 .341 0 1 
Number of observations 16,116(1756 parcels) 
* - Time varying covariate 
Sources:  Maryland Department of Planning; Maryland Department of Assessments 






4.2.1 Options Variables 
 
The principle empirical task is to test whether the presence of the easement 
option delays development. The variable (Easement) equals one in the years a parcel 
is eligible to sell a preservation easement and in which a county preservation program 
budget exists to purchase easements. This variable is updated for parcels that became 
eligible during the study period due to prior preservation of adjacent parcels.  
The drift and variance variables described in Chapter 2 are intended to capture 
the effects of uncertainty on development timing decisions. Landowners/developers 
are assumed to form expectations on returns from development based on recent new  
house sales in the same geographic and socioeconomic vicinity. Therefore, the drift 
and variance variables are constructed using a separate dataset of sales of new and 
existing houses – all of which were built within the last 10 years. Sales in which price 
exceeded two standard deviations from the Census tract average for the year were 
omitted in order to eliminate the undue influence of outliers whose special 
characteristics were not measurable. After eliminating these outliers, non-arms length 
sales, and clearly mistyped entries, 37,085 observations remained.  
The drift variable for any given tract and year was calculated as the average 
rate of growth in deflated lot price for sales within the tract over the 3 previous 
years34, corrected for some principle sources of price variation. For example, a 
landowner/developer forming expectations on the drift and variance in returns in 
                                                 
34 Pooled lagged sales prices from 2, 3, 4, and 5 years were also tested with remarkably consistent 
results in terms of the magnitude of variance. As one would expect the drift calculation stabilized and 




order to make an investment decision in 1996 is assumed to use information on 
housing sales within the relevant Census tract from the years 1993, 1994, and 1995. 
The covariates included to account for systematic price variation are the natural logs 
of each of the following - distance to Washington DC, lot size, square-footage of 
house - as well as an index for quality of construction, the age of the home at the sale 
data, and a dummy variable for townhouse. These covariates are represented by the W 
vector in equation (22) below.  
 A separate drift and variance value is calculated for each area of the county 
(defined by 15 groups of Census tracts) and each year of the analysis (11 years from 
1991 through 2001), by estimating 15 regressions for each year of the analysis, one 
for each Census tract. Thus the impact of the W variables on price is allowed to vary 
across the tracts and years within the county. To isolate the drift an implicit temporal 
effect for each tract is estimated. Specifically, for any analysis year t and census tract 
the following OLS regression was estimated: 
(22)         1,...15n    )ln( 10 =∀+++= inininnnni WlagyeardeflatedSP εϑββ . 
Each regression included all qualifying sales for years t-1, t-2, and t-3. The variable 
deflatedSPi is defined as the inflation adjusted sales price in 2000 dollars for the i
th 
sale, and lagyeari equals s if the i
th sale took place in year t-4+s (s=1,2,3). A total of 
165 regressions were estimated. The coefficient on (lagyear), n1β , becomes the 
measure for the drift parameter for the nth Census tract group and the tth year of 
analysis of the regression.  





























)/(5.0exp 2 kLdeflatedSPdeflatedSP niinin ε  is the variance adjusted 
expected sales price, Ln is the number of observations in tract n, and k is the number 
of regressors. This variance is calculated for each of the 165 regressions (15 tracts 
and 11 analysis years) in the dataset. The absolute level of variance is not the desired 
variable but the percentage of variance relative to sales price is, so this measure is 
standardized by dividing by the mean sales price in the respective tract.  
The average drift for the entire sample is 0.645% and the average standard 
deviation is 16.75%. Of course, few observations in a year can lead to a high variance 
- but this is appropriate as it is a signal of the limited information on recent sales with 
which current landowners can develop their expectations.35 
In summary, this analysis does not depend on commonly used sources of 
national land use data, but instead on micro, parcel level data spanning a time horizon 
of approximately one decade. This extremely rich dataset of time invariant attributes 
including parcel characteristics and location characteristics combined with time 
varying attributes such as the options variables, land use, interest rates, development 
rates, and recording dates for preservation or conversion decisions provides 
information on the re-construction of the landscape as of the end of 1990 as well as 
the pattern and timing of land conversion from 1991 to 2001. This dataset allows 
estimation of a data ‘hungry’ general model of the timing of land conversion and 
                                                 
35 Specifications used in this analysis assume constant and homogeneous discount rates (ρ) across 
landowners, as data limitations preclude controlling for variation in landowner discount rates. The 




preservation decisions. The appropriate model incorporates the dynamics inherent in 
the process of land use change which are often overlooked when estimating land 
conversion decisions.36 
                                                 
36 In fact, many land use studies use the ‘current’ landscape as the source of data, failing to account for 
the direct correlation of the housing units within one subdivision. For example a twenty unit 




5. Empirical Implementation and Results 
 
A necessary step in evaluating the impact of the preservation option on the 
conversion decision in the competing risks framework is the selection of an 
appropriate baseline hazard specification and a specification for the unobserved 
heterogeneity. The best way to select these distributions is to evaluate each risk 
individually and statistically eliminate specifications, if possible, or heuristically 
eliminate specifications, if not, by comparing output of parametric and nonparametric 
models.  
5.1 Model Selection – Conversion Risk 
 
The starting point for model selection is to determine if a time dependent 
baseline hazard is necessary.  If not, the exponential baseline, which imposes a time 
invariant baseline hazard, can be employed. Ideally, a researcher would like to 
understand a process so completely that there exists no remaining dependency on 
time, but this is rarely if ever possible.  
Throughout this section the estimated models will incorporate covariates as 
described in Chapter 4. Although the coefficient estimates are important, the 
coefficient impacts should not be directly interpreted until appropriate specification 
tests are performed. At this point in the model selection process the covariates are 
serving two purposes. First and foremost, they control for observable variation in 




across models, from nonparametric to fully parametric, provides the researcher with 
an indication of sensitivity to the parametric assumptions imposed by each model.  
To determine if a time dependent baseline hazard is necessary a Weibull 
model, which allows a monotonic baseline, is compared with the exponential 
baseline, which has no dependency on time. Because the exponential is nested in the 
Weibull, a likelihood ratio test can be used. Based on this test the null hypothesis of 
an exponential, “memoryless”, hazard is rejected in favor of a time dependent 
baseline at a critical level of less than 1%.37    
The baseline estimate for the Weibull model is presented in Figure 5.1. The 
extreme curvature of the Weibull specification in the early periods is unconvincing in 
the land use context and probably an artifact of the Weibull’s behavior around time, 
t=0. It is not likely that parcels in 1990 have a very small baseline hazard rate which 
increases sharply through the early months. This is especially true as the data for this 
analysis begin in 1990, not at the beginning of a parcel’s lifetime. It seems logical 
that the hazard rate at the beginning of the study period should be a non-zero rate. 
The Gompertz specification allows the hazard rate to take non-zero values in the 
interval around t=0 and is also a monotonic hazard specification. In Figure 5.2 the 
estimated Gompertz and Weibull baseline hazard results are portrayed and illustrate 






                                                 
37 The null hypothesis is rejected using a likelihood ratio test, chi2(1) = 10.69 at 0.0011. 
38 Also included in Figure 4 are results from the exponential, which imposes a constant baseline 




Figure 5.1:  Weibull Parametric Baseline Hazard Conversion Risk. 
 
The behavior of the Weibull at in the neighborhood of t=0 was also analyzed 
by Ridder and Woutersen (2003) who suggest restrictions on the Weibull in mixed 
proportional hazard models necessary to reach convergence rates similar to the 
Gompertz. Interestingly, their restrictions amount to bounding the baseline away from 
0 or ∞ in the small interval around t=0. These facts, combined with the fact that the 
coefficient estimates associated with model covariates are quite similar between the 
Weibull and Gompertz models as illustrated in Table 5.1, suggest the Gompertz 
specification is most appropriate. However, before finalizing the choice of a baseline 
hazard specification, sensitivity of coefficient estimates under less parametric 
versions of the baseline hazard is necessary. If coefficient estimates are not stable 
across parametric and nonparametric estimators it is possible the parametric 










Table 5.1 Parametric Baseline Hazard, Conversion Risk  
 Gompertz  Weibull  Exp  
Variables       
Options variables 
Easement -0.4855 ** -0.4549 * -0.5123 ** 
Variance measure -0.0252 * -0.0192  -0.0299 ** 
Drift Measure -0.0037  0.0072  -0.0042  
Development Returns 
distDC -0.0103  -0.0093  -0.0112 * 
distBA 0.0054  0.0052  0.0057  
sluDevWithHs -0.0222 ** -0.0222 ** -0.0221 ** 
sluDevNoHs -0.0114 ** -0.0102 ** -0.0120 ** 
sluComm -0.0113 ** -0.0112 ** -0.0113 ** 
sluSubdiv 0.0095  0.0118 * 0.0082  
sluPreserved -0.0201 ** -0.0206 ** -0.0198 ** 
sluOpen 0.0117  0.0117  0.0119 * 
sluRoad 0.0070 * 0.0075 * 0.0066  
sluProtected -0.0002  -0.0001  -0.0002  
sluExempt -0.0232 ** -0.0235 ** -0.0231 ** 
devRate 0.0497 ** 0.0567 ** 0.0459 ** 
popDen 0.1735  0.1993  0.1574  
numLots 0.0003  0.0005  0.0002  
reqOpenSpace -0.1377  -0.1224  -0.1489  
Opportunity costs 
class1 0.0107  0.0105  0.0110  
class2 0.0030  0.0030  0.0029  
class3 0.0010  0.0011  0.0009  
class4 0.0007  0.0009  0.0006  
agriculture -0.0032  -0.0035  -0.0030  
acres 0.2685 ** 0.2676 ** 0.2703 ** 
hasHouse -0.9187 ** -0.9319 ** -0.9096 ** 
Conversion costs 
steep -0.0060 ** -0.0062 ** -0.0059 ** 
forested -0.0015  -0.0016  -0.0015  
notRoadSuit -0.0050 ** -0.0050 ** -0.0050 ** 
notSepticSuit -0.0003  -0.0004  -0.0003  
sewerPlanned -0.7178 ** -0.7045 ** -0.7392 ** 
intRate -0.1253 ** -0.1333 ** -0.1098 ** 
apfo -0.2014  -0.2564  -0.1375  
       
Constant -4.2134 ** -5.1200 ** -4.7333 ** 
 0.0018  0.1636 **   






5.1.1 Semi-parametric and Nonparametric Specifications 
 
A sensitivity analysis is performed by comparing the fully parametric 
Gompertz model’s coefficient and baseline hazard estimates with estimates from 
models that incorporate semi-parametric baseline specification and models that 
abstract from the baseline hazard altogether (i.e. the Cox model). When the pattern of 
coefficients’ signs and significance are similar across models, one can feel more 
comfortable with the parametric baseline specification.  
Semi-parametric estimation of the baseline hazard uses the piecewise 
exponential specification described in Chapter 3 but allows the resulting 
“memoryless” baseline to vary across pre-specified intervals of time. The piecewise 
specification has the advantage of removing temporal unobserved heterogeneity not 
already represented by time varying covariates in the data. Estimation of this model 
requires dividing the study period into time intervals which can be done in any of a 
number of ways. Time intervals are typically groups of sequential time periods in the 
data, grouped in intervals defined by calendar time or into intervals where an equal 
number of failures occur. The former method is implemented here by allowing the 
baseline hazard to be constant over all observations within a calendar year but vary 
between years. This is accomplished by including a dummy variable for each year in 
the exponential baseline model. Splitting the data on calendar time puts different 
numbers of failure events and observations in each interval. The latter procedure of 
grouping the data such that an equal number of failure events fall into each interval 
allows the data to ‘choose’ the interval width. For this method dummy variables are 





For this analysis, both approaches are considered. In order to choose the 
number of intervals for the grouping by number of failures approach, three different 
sized groups of failures are estimated. The resulting Akaike Information Criteria 
(AIC) statistic is compared across these three specifications, as well as with the 
specification which incorporates yearly dummies, in order to select the best fitting 
model.39  The intervals for the percentage of failures approach are tested for 4, 6, and 
8 groups of failures, and the AIC values from these models are 2622, 2620, and 2614 
respectively. The AIC value using the calendar year approach is 2622. Figure 5.3 
displays the baseline hazard estimates from each of these models and includes the 
Gompertz baseline for comparison. From these interval based piecewise estimates, it 
is easy to see how a few months of high conversion activity in the middle of the study 
period are represented in the baseline hazard estimation. However, one could argue 
that the general pattern of the baseline estimates is flat or increasing in time as in the 
Gompertz baseline. In the remainder of the paper all references to the piecewise 






                                                 
39 Non-nested models such as the Weibull and Gompertz can be compared using the Akaike 
Information Criteria (AIC) proposed by Akaike (1974) defined as, 
)(2ln2 ckLAIC ++−=  
where lnL is the log-likelihood value, k is the number of covariates in the model, and c is the number 
of ancillary parameters. Although the best fitting model typically has the largest log likelihood, the 
AIC is designed to penalize models with excessive parameters. The most preferred model has the 





Figure 5.3:  Piecewise Baseline Hazards Conversion Risk.  
 
 
The specification of a baseline can be heuristically validated by comparing the 
coefficient estimates against the nonparametric alternative, the Cox model. Loosely 
speaking, if there are dramatic differences in coefficient estimates between the 
nonparametric and parametric baseline specifications, the imposition of the 
parametric baseline should be questioned further. If the coefficient estimates are not 
sensitive to the selection of the parametric model then the researcher can be more 
confident in the results. Table 5.2 displays the coefficient estimates from the 
piecewise model and the Cox model. Not only are the estimates similar to one another 
but the pattern, size, and significance of the estimated coefficients are very similar to 
those from the fully parametric Gompertz specification presented in Table 5.1. The 




which is negative in the parametric Gompertz model and positive in the less 
parametric models, though not significant in either. The coefficient on easement 
eligibility and the variance measure are consistently negative and significant in 




Table 5.2   Non/Semi Parametric Results, Conversion Risk 
Baseline specification Cox PW Exp  
   8 intervals  
Variables     
Options variables 
Easement -0.5277 ** -0.5289 ** 
Variance measure -0.0259 ** -0.0265 * 
Drift Measure 0.0185  0.0093  
Development Returns 
distDC -0.0111 * -0.0111 * 
distBA 0.0054  0.0054  
sluDevWithHs -0.0219 ** -0.0218 ** 
sluDevNoHs -0.0106 ** -0.0107 ** 
sluComm -0.0114 ** -0.0113 ** 
sluSubdiv 0.0108  0.0106  
sluPreserved -0.0203 ** -0.0201 ** 
sluOpen 0.0120 ** 0.0117  
sluRoad 0.0069  0.0068 * 
sluProtected -0.0003  -0.0002  
sluExempt -0.0237 ** -0.0235 ** 
devRate 0.0549 ** 0.0544 ** 
popDen 0.1880  0.1873  
numLots 0.0003  0.0003  
reqOpenSpace -0.1365  -0.1344  
Opportunity costs 
class1 0.0114  0.0113  
class2 0.0032  0.0032  
class3 0.0011  0.0011  
class4 0.0010  0.0010  
agriculture -0.0032 * -0.0032  
acres 0.2745 ** 0.2737 ** 
hasHouse -0.9207 ** -0.9196 ** 
Conversion costs 
steep -0.0062 ** -0.0061 ** 
forested -0.0016  -0.0016  
notRoadSuit -0.0050 ** -0.0050 ** 
notSepticSuit -0.0005  -0.0005  
sewerPlanned -0.7655 ** -0.7625 ** 
intRate 0.3237  -0.0823  
Apfo -0.0388  -0.0459  
     
Constant   -4.7333 ** 





Results from these baseline hazard specification tests suggest the use of a 
Gompertz parametric baseline may not be inappropriate, but since the focus of this 
analysis is on interpreting the coefficient estimates it is probably best to choose the 
less parametric piecewise model. Should simulation or prediction be important, the 
Gompertz specification likely provides the necessary structure to permit an acceptable 
degree of confidence in the results. The remainder of this chapter will explore both 
the piecewise exponential and the Gompertz baseline hazard specifications.  
5.1.2 Unobserved Heterogeneity   
 
A second distributional assumption is required for each risk to implement the 
dependent competing risks model. This assumption pertains to the distribution of 
unobserved heterogeneity. Unobserved heterogeneity is likely to exist in any study of 
human decision making, and as described in Chapter 3 there are many sources of 
unobserved heterogeneity likely to influence land conversion decisions including 
parcel attributes and landowner attributes. This section will demonstrate the existence 
of unobserved heterogeneity in the conversion hazard and attempt to validate a 
functional form for its distribution.  
Recall from equation (15) that the accepted way of including heterogeneity 
involves a multiplicative term added to the baseline proportional hazard specification 
which follows a known distribution and adds an estimated parameter for the variance 
of this distribution to the models. There are many distributions commonly used to 
represent individual specific unobserved heterogeneity and, as with the baseline 




final specification for unobserved heterogeneity for the dependent competing risk is 
accomplished by investigating several distributions and comparing results with 
nonparametric unobserved heterogeneity. Because it is not possible to validate one 
specification versus another directly, this part of the model selection process involves 
analyzing the sensitivity of parametric results versus the nonparametric alternative in 
the context of the heterogeneity distribution.  
Gamma, Log Normal, and finite mixture distributions are estimated for this 
exercise using both parametric (Gompertz) and semi-parametric (piecewise 
exponential) forms of the baseline hazard suggested from the previous section. These 
distributions are selected for the unobserved heterogeneity parameter because a) the 
Gamma distribution is a popular choice in the existing literature, b) the log normal is 
more general than the Gamma parametric distribution in this context, and c) the finite 
mixture is nonparametric and can mimic many distributions (Weinke, et. Al. 2005; 
van den Berg, Lindeboom, and Ridder 1993).40  In fact, in the case of a single risk 
hazard model the piecewise exponential baseline with a finite mixture heterogeneity 
distribution is the least parametric full information maximum likelihood estimation 
that can be implemented. Recall that adding a distribution for the heterogeneity term 
in these models forms a new class of models referred to as mixed proportional hazard 
models where the ‘mixed’ term refers to the mixture of the baseline distribution and a 
distribution for the unobserved heterogeneity. In the next two paragraphs results from 
the Gamma heterogeneity distribution will be presented though similar arguments can 
be made for the Log Normal heterogeneity distribution. 
                                                 
40 Log normal distributions require numerical integration to evaluate the likelihood function. This is 




Results from the Gompertz baseline model in the presence of unobserved 
heterogeneity are presented in Table 5.3. The estimated heterogeneity parameter (the 
variance of the heterogeneity distribution) is significant in each model suggesting that 
unobserved heterogeneity exists in these data and should be accounted for in the 
competing risks framework. A graphical representation of the influence of 
unobserved heterogeneity on the resulting baseline hazard is presented in Figure 5.4. 
It appears that the model which ignores unobserved heterogeneity may produce a 
negatively biased baseline hazard estimate. Incorporating unobserved heterogeneity 
in the model seems to alleviate negative bias in the baseline hazard as evident in 
Figure 5.4. Figure 5.4 compares the baseline hazards from the model which ignores 
unobserved heterogeneity to a model with Gamma unobserved heterogeneity. The 
baseline hazard which ignores unobserved heterogeneity is less positively duration 
dependent than the Gamma heterogeneity model. However, a comparison of 
coefficient estimates between the parametric and nonparametric unobserved 
heterogeneity models suggests that the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity 




Table 5.3  Gompertz specification with heterogeneity, Conversion Risk 
Baseline 
specification Gompertz Gompertz Gompertz Gompertz 
Heterogeneity 
specification  Gamma Log Normal 
Finite 
Mixture 
         
Variables         
Options variables 
Easement -0.4855 ** -0.5436 ** -0.6051 ** -0.5015 * 
Variance measure -0.0252 * -0.0282 ** -0.0358 ** -0.0368 ** 
Drift Measure -0.0037  -0.0058  -0.0075  -0.0048  
Development returns 
distDC -0.0103  -0.0097  -0.0116  -0.0117 * 
distBA 0.0054  0.0067  0.0061  0.0063  
sluDevWithHs -0.0222 ** -0.0243 ** -0.0244 ** -0.0234 ** 
sluDevNoHs -0.0114 ** -0.0130 ** -0.0145 ** -0.0134 ** 
sluComm -0.0113 ** -0.0147 ** -0.0159 ** -0.0189 ** 
sluSubdiv 0.0095  0.0104  0.0099  0.0101  
sluPreserved -0.0201 ** -0.0222 ** -0.0224 ** -0.0210 ** 
sluOpen 0.0117  0.0156 ** 0.0177 ** 0.0206 ** 
sluRoad 0.0070 * 0.0088 * 0.0099 * 0.0085 * 
sluProtected -0.0002  0.0010  0.0014  0.0006  
sluExempt -0.0232 ** -0.0244 ** -0.0248 ** -0.0247 ** 
devRate 0.0497 ** 0.0484 ** 0.0447 ** 0.0397 ** 
popDen 0.1735  0.2350  0.2164  0.2264  
numLots 0.0003  0.0008  0.0008  0.0022 ** 
reqOpenSpace -0.1377  -0.1665  -0.1789  -0.1728  
Opportunity costs 
class1 0.0107  0.0109  0.0117  0.0136  
class2 0.0030  0.0024  0.0024  0.0020  
class3 0.0010  0.0006  0.0006  0.0002  
class4 0.0007  -0.0003  -0.0007  -0.0014  
agriculture -0.0032  -0.0032  -0.0032  -0.0023  
Acres 0.2685 ** 0.3082 ** 0.3242 ** 0.2993 ** 
hasHouse -0.9187 ** -0.9975 ** -1.0263 ** -0.9658 ** 
Conversion costs 
steep -0.0060 ** -0.0070 ** -0.0071 ** -0.0069 ** 
forested -0.0015  -0.0016  -0.0018  -0.0012  
notRoadSuit -0.0050 ** -0.0056 ** -0.0057 ** -0.0057 ** 
notSepticSuit -0.0003  -0.0001  -0.0003  -0.0001  
sewerPlanned -0.7178 ** -0.7747 ** -0.8447 ** -0.8935 ** 
intRate -0.1253 ** -0.1256 ** -0.1067 * -0.1063 * 
apfo -0.2014  -0.2148  -0.1246  -0.1273  
         




         
Shape parameter 0.0018  0.0038 ** 0.0019  0.0007  
Heterogeneity 
parameter    .0.4789 ** 0.8384 **   
Fixed point 1       -0.6000  
point 2       2.4612 ** 
Weight 1       -0.8648 ** 
** - significant at 5%, * - significant at 10% 
 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, when 
excluded from the analysis, often leads to spurious negative duration dependence 
because observations with ‘large’ draws from the unobserved heterogeneity 
distribution will tend to fail early in the study. As time moves forward, the surviving 
observations will be comprised of observations with ‘smaller’ draws from the 
unobserved heterogeneity distribution. In this case smaller draws imply a smaller 
hazard and thus these observations will tend to be in the sample longer. If unobserved 
heterogeneity is not modeled the baseline hazard is likely to exhibit negative duration 
dependence even if the true duration dependence is not negative for any observation 









Similar to the Gompertz baseline hazard, the piecewise hazard model 
produces a negatively biased baseline hazard when unobserved heterogeneity is 
ignored. Table 5.4 presents the results from these models and Figure 5.5 displays the 
impact on the semi-parametric baseline hazard when Gamma unobserved 
heterogeneity is introduced. In the piecewise model the heterogeneity parameters are 
also significant, implying that even with some temporal heterogeneity removed by the 
semi-parametric baseline there remains significant individual level unobserved 
heterogeneity in the data. Again, the estimated coefficients are relatively insensitive 
to the choice of parametric unobserved heterogeneity distribution when compared to 





Table 5.4 Piece wise exponential models with Heterogeneity, Conversion Risk 
Baseline 
specification PW Exp  PW Exp  PW Exp  PW Exp   
Variables   Gamma  Log Normal  
Finite 
Mix   
Options variables  
Easement -0.5289 ** -0.6050 ** -0.7247 ** -0.5645 **  
Variance 
measure -0.0265 * -0.0298 ** -0.0358 ** -0.0358 **  
Drift Measure 0.0093  0.0081  -0.0192  -0.0170   
Development Returns  
distDC -0.0111 * -0.0105  -0.0113  -0.0117   
distBA 0.0054  0.0066  0.0062  0.0058   
sluDevWithHs -0.0218 ** -0.0239 ** -0.0262 ** -0.0234 **  
sluDevNoHs -0.0107 ** -0.0122 ** -0.0160 ** -0.0133 **  
sluComm -0.0113 ** -0.0148 ** -0.0184 ** -0.0189 **  
sluSubdiv 0.0106  0.0118  0.0122  0.0107   
sluPreserved -0.0201 ** -0.0221 ** -0.0246 ** -0.0210 **  
sluOpen 0.0117  0.0160 ** 0.0197 ** 0.0209 **  
sluRoad 0.0068 * 0.0088 * 0.0119 * 0.0087 *  
sluProtected -0.0002  0.0012  0.0019  0.0006   
sluExempt -0.0235 ** -0.0246 ** -0.0268 ** -0.0246 **  
devRate 0.0544 ** 0.0535 ** 0.0494 ** 0.0423 **  
popDen 0.1873  0.2534  0.2649  0.2437   
numLots 0.0003  0.0008  0.0014  0.0021 *  
reqOpenSpace -0.1344  -0.1610  -0.1746  -0.1610   
       Opportunity costs  
class1 0.0113  0.0115  0.0113  0.0137   
class2 0.0032  0.0027  0.0022  0.0020   
class3 0.0011  0.0007  0.0004  0.0001   
class4 0.0010  0.0000  -0.0009  -0.0012   
agriculture -0.0032  -0.0032  -0.0036  -0.0023   
acres 0.2737 ** 0.3167 ** 0.3608 ** 0.3072 **  
hasHouse -0.9196 ** -1.0001 ** -1.1322 ** -0.9741 **  
Conversion costs  
steep -0.0061 ** -0.0071 ** -0.0081 ** -0.0070 **  
forested -0.0016  -0.0017  -0.0022  -0.0014   
notRoadSuit -0.0050 ** -0.0056 ** -0.0063 ** -0.0057 **  
notSepticSuit -0.0005  -0.0003  -0.0006  -0.0002   
sewerPlanned -0.7625 ** -0.8351 ** -0.9177 ** -0.9030 **  
intRate -0.0823  -0.0875  -0.1418  -0.1396   
apfo -0.0459  -0.0523  -0.0180  -0.0170   
          
Constant -4.7333 ** -4.7035 ** -4.2616 ** -5.9036 **  





parameter   0.4883 ** 1.0961 **    
Fixed point 1       -0.6000   
point 2       2.4255 **  
Weight 1       -0.8229 **  
** - significant at 5%, * - significant at 10% 
Based on these results unobserved heterogeneity appears to be present in these 
data, but the functional form of the heterogeneity distribution does not significantly 
impact the resulting coefficient estimates. Based on this fact the log normal 
distribution will be used in the dependent competing risks models because it is more 
tractable than either the Gamma or the finite mixture when correlating across risks 
where a bivariate distribution is required. The analysis, to this point, suggests that it is 
most appropriate to model the conversion hazard using a piecewise exponential 
baseline (8 intervals) and with unobserved heterogeneity in order to determine the 
impact of the preservation program. However, if a fully parametric model is required 
the Gompertz baseline hazard could also be utilized for the competing risks model 
without great reservation. Excluding one short period of intense activity, picked up by 
the piecewise exponential, the Gompertz baseline hazard and the piecewise baseline 
are quite similar. To this point, none of the models account for the second exit state 
available to landowners in this study area, the exit to preservation. This will be 
handled by the dependent competing risks model, but before estimating the 
competing risks model a similar set of distributional assumptions are required for the 












5.2 Model Selection - Preservation Risk 
 
Because many of tools necessary to select the functional forms for the 
preservation risk are identical to the conversion risk, and given the detail devoted to 
these in the previous section, this section will briefly describe the preservation hazard 
and justify the restrictions placed on this model. As in the conversion hazard the first 
step is to choose a baseline hazard specification. Fully parametric baseline hazard 
models are estimated and a likelihood ratio test is performed to compare a 
‘memoryless’ baseline hazard versus a monotonic baseline. Unlike the conversion 
hazard case, the null hypothesis of a time invariant baseline hazard (i.e. the 
exponential distribution) is not rejected for these data.41  This suggests an increasing 
or decreasing baseline hazard specification such as the Gompertz or Weibull is not 
necessary.  
As in the conversion hazard, the nonparametric Cox model is used to validate 
that the functional specification of the baseline hazard is not dramatically influencing 
the estimated coefficients. Table 5.5 displays the results from the exponential and the 
Weibull model compared to the Cox model. The estimated coefficients are similar 
across these models and allow the selection of the exponential baseline for the 
preservation hazard to be made with some degree of confidence. 
                                                 





Table 5.5 Preservation Hazard – Exponential Baseline  
Preservation 
Hazard 




Funded    2.2576 ** 2.4040 ** ^  1.7175 * 
Acres 0.0656 ** 0.0667 ** 0.0873 ** 0.1258 ** 
distDC 0.0293  -0.0020  0.0019  0.0519  
distBA -0.0049  0.0306  0.0357 * -0.0089  
sluDevWithHs -0.0061  -0.0077  -0.0048  -0.0130  
sluDevNoHs 0.0262 ** 0.0279 ** 0.0197 * 0.0197  
sluComm 0.0110  0.0122  0.0128  0.0006  
sluSubdiv 0.0198  0.0250  0.0126  -0.0078  
sluPreserved 0.0083  0.0064  0.0130  0.0134  
sluOpen -1.5834 * -1.5525  -1.8276  -2.5948  
sluRoad -0.0893 ** -0.0854 ** -0.0925 ** -0.1312 * 
sluProtected -0.0288  -0.0275  -0.0231  -0.0431  
sluExempt 0.0024  0.0024  -0.0003  -0.0017  
class1    -0.0667 ** -0.0644 ** -0.0651 ** -0.0994 ** 
class2    -0.0986 ** -0.0946 ** -0.0919 ** -0.1372 ** 
class3    -0.0959 ** -0.0917 ** -0.0925 ** -0.1305 ** 
class4    -0.0607 ** -0.0584 ** -0.0628 ** -0.0931 ** 
steep     -0.0217  -0.0232  -0.0218  -0.0316  
forested 0.0289  0.0297  0.0254  0.0272  
agriculture 0.0457 * 0.0461 * 0.0401  0.0496  
hasHouse -2.3673 ** -2.3368 ** -2.1688 ** -3.2487 ** 
         
Preservation 
Constant -4.1289  -5.7950 *   -1.2830  
         
Heterogeneity parameter     1.4451 ** 
       
Number of obs   = 257 (2009 observations) 
No. of failures = 59 
 ^ - does not vary over observations thus cancels out of Cox partial likelihood 
** - significant at 5%, * - significant at 10% 
 
Finally, unobserved heterogeneity is incorporated using the log normal 
distribution and the results are presented in the last column of Table 5.5. Once again 




significance of the parameter estimates.42  To complete the assumptions necessary to 
estimate the competing risks model the exponential baseline with log normal 
heterogeneity is assumed an appropriate model. Now the full competing risks models 
can be specified and estimated. 
5.3 Competing Risks Models and Results 
 
In most empirical hazard applications it is common to assume other potential 
exit states are randomly censored, and thus observations that exit via pathways other 
than the transition under study do not impact the failure of interest to the researcher. 
That is, these additional exits are assumed independent of the failure event of interest. 
But in many, if not most, cases the competing events are likely to share common 
causes, so that their event times can rarely be assumed independent. Such correlation 
should be modeled to avoid bias.  
Up to this point, non-random censoring has been assumed by each single risk 
model discussed in this chapter, a modeling strategy that is correct only if exits due to 
preservation are independent of the conversion decision and vice versa. In the 
analysis of the conversion (preservation) risk, a preservation (conversion) decision 
simply causes an observation to drop out of the risk set. Because the attributes that are 
likely to influence preservation are similar to the attributes that influence conversion 
this random censoring assumption is potentially an erroneous one. To address this 
problem the preservation decision is modeled jointly with the conversion decision in a 
true competing risks model.  
                                                 




The choice of distributions required to estimate the empirical model is made 
based on the exploratory work of the previous sections. A piecewise exponential 
baseline hazard and a Gompertz baseline hazard are considered in turn for the 
conversion risk. An exponential baseline hazard is specified for the preservation risk. 
Both a log normal and a bivariate log normal are considered for the heterogeneity 
distribution. Again, the log normal is selected for tractability and because the single 
conversion risk results were similar between the Gamma, log normal, and the 
(nonparametric) finite mixture distributions of heterogeneity.  
This log normal heterogeneity distribution is incorporated in two forms in the 
dependent competing risks model. First, the univariate heterogeneity distribution 
restricts the heterogeneity parameter to be the same in each risk. This representation 
is consistent with a world where unobservables describe the landowner’s propensity 
to “move” or enter into some new land agreement (be it preservation or 
development). This may be the case where a financial situation requires the 
landowner either to sell the property or to sell an easement (i.e. enroll in the 
preservation program). Second, the bivariate case allows heterogeneity to be present 
in each risk in different degrees and correlates the dependency across risks via a 
jointly estimated correlation parameter. This discussion will focus on the results from 
the bivariate case because the univariate case does not differ dramatically.  
With the distributional assumptions based on the single risk hazards in hand, 
the competing risks model developed in Chapter 3 is estimated and the results are 
reported (see Table 5.6). Before discussing the coefficient estimates it is useful to 




model produces.43  Figure 5.6 displays the conversion hazard using the piecewise 
exponential baseline, where an exponential baseline for the preservation hazard and 
bivariate heterogeneity are implemented.  
Figure 5.6:  Competing Risks Piecewise Exponential Baseline Hazard, 
Conversion Risk. 
 
This semi-parametric baseline function from the competing risks model is similar in 
shape to the estimates from the single case, given in Figure 5.5, but the magnitude is 
amplified. The baseline hazard from the conversion risk with heterogeneity exhibits a 
maximum of approximately .03, while in the competing risks model the maximum is 
closer to .045. Similarly, the minimum value of the baseline is shifted up, from less 
than 0.010 in the single risk case to almost 0.015 in the competing risk case. This 
difference in magnitudes is evident by comparing the difference in median conversion 
                                                 




time by model. In the single risk case the median conversion time from the piecewise 
model with log normal heterogeneity is 33 years while the median conversion time is 
24 years in the competing risks model.  
  Overall, the variables for unobserved heterogeneity within each risk are 
significant, similar to the single risk models. This suggests heterogeneity within risks 
exists and is indicative of the need to model these elements even though this 
application is in a data rich modeling environment and has used a flexible 
econometric specification. However, the correlation between these unobserved 
components is not significant. This could be a consequence of the choice of the 
heterogeneity distribution, which may be incapable of detecting this competing risk 
correlation, or it may suggest that cross risk correlations are adequately captured by 
the variation in the observable data. Unfortunately, these explanations cannot be 
validated.  The competing risks model remains the most realistic model to mimic the 
real world decision process facing landowners in this study and will be utilized to 
discuss the coefficient estimates.  
5.3.1 Competing Risks Results – Discussion of Coefficients 
 
The empirical model developed in Chapter 3 and the data discussion in 
Chapter 4 includes several covariates intended to control for differences in 
development profitability and preservation likelihood across parcels at risk. The 
discussion of the estimated coefficients begins with these covariates, not because 




plausible results in these controls provide support for interpretations with regard to 
the options variables.  
Recalling the discussion in Chapter 4, variables are included in the model if 
they are likely to have a bearing on the returns from development, the construction 
costs of development, and/or the opportunity costs of converting a parcel to 
development. Also included are covariates that might alter the appeal of a parcel as an 
easement sale by the county. Explanatory variables that affect both the returns to 
development, as well as the ranking the county is likely to place on the parcel should 
it be offered for easement sale, include measures of surrounding land uses. Relative to 
the normalized category – developed residential land – several categories of 
surrounding land use have a depressing influence on development. Specifically, 
commercial and institutional neighbors appear to have a depressing effect on 
development likelihood, as does neighboring land that is developable or has been 
preserved – all relative to residential development. Only open space has a (relatively) 
positive effect as a neighbor on development, as do existing roads (that offer road 
frontage valuable for development). As will be explored in the next few chapters, 
these results should not be accepted too literally, as there is an inherent sample 
selection bias lurking in this model. But for now, this is not an important 
consideration, as the description of surrounding land use is included as a control only 
at this point in the analysis.  
Other controls related to parcel location include the recent rate of new home 
construction measured by devRate which is positive and significant. This variable 




rate of construction and, indirectly, the approval rate of subdivisions in the 
neighborhood of each parcel. The rate of subdivision and thus new construction 
activity may be due to unobservables in the county planning office where 
development approvals may be based in part on some unpublished county 
prerogatives. This measure also proxies for attractive locations of the county based on 
unobservables that developers may perceive, but are not visible to researchers. As 
with other control variables that may relate to the spatial distribution land conversion, 
direct interpretation of this variable as a policy relevant measure is not appropriate 
because this model is not designed to control for selection issues which likely exist in 
placement of new conversions.  See Irwin and Bockstael (2002) for a detailed 
discussion.   
Variables which represent the opportunity costs of development, including 
acreage and the presence of an existing house, are associated with significant 
coefficients. Larger parcels are more likely to convert at a rate of 3-4% more per acre. 
44  The larger parcel is more likely to be a viable agricultural parcel but from the 
developer’s perspective a larger parcel is potentially a more attractive investment 
because the marginal costs are likely decreasing in the number of units, at least in 
construction costs.  Administrative costs are likely to be fixed at least over ranges of 
subdivision project size, contributing to economics of scale even when these 
additional bureaucratic costs are included.   The presence of an existing structure 
significantly delays conversion and is either an opportunity cost, if the structure is 
viable in housing, or a construction cost, if the unit will need renovation or removal 
for the subdivision plan to proceed.  Not surprisingly, the soil classification variables 
                                                 




tell us little about the conversion decision, in part because soil quality impacts both 
agricultural returns and cost of development.   
As for other measures related to construction costs, land poorly suited for road 
construction or septic systems is found to impact conversion timing negatively, which 
implies developers may be leaving this land in the sample longer while focusing on 
lands cheaper to convert. a higher value for the percentage of the parcel with very 
steep slopes tends to delay the conversion decision.  Although potentially producing 
views, steep slopes reduce the yield of units per parcel and increase the costs related 
to septic system placement, erosion control, and landscaping.  
As discussed in Chapter 4, variables relating directly to the preservation 
hazard include parcel attributes that define qualification for the easement program. 
These include acreage and land use of the parcel itself, as well as surrounding land 
uses because parcels can qualify or receive preferential treatment based on the land 
uses of neighbors. Many of the estimated coefficients are in line with expectations. 
For example, acreage has a positive and significant effect suggesting larger parcels 
are more likely to preserve. Among the surrounding land uses preservation and 
developable land without a house increase the hazard of preservation.    
Other coefficients exhibit potentially counterintuitive results. For example, the 
percentages of land in good agricultural soil classes are significant and negative.  
However, parcels with very good agricultural soils may represent viable agricultural 
operations with no financial need to encumber the land with a preservation easement. 




variable controls for the fact that parcels only enroll in years when funding is 
available.  
Finally, the presence of a house decreases the likelihood of preservation. This 
may seem counterintuitive unless one considers the family lot rules of the easement 
program. Based on the county’s rules, the landowner is allowed one family lot per 50 
acres of preserved land. Consider a landowner who owns 105 acres. He has the 
incentive first to split the land into a large 100 acre parcel and his 5 acre housing lot 
prior to enrollment. At that point, the landowner could enroll the 100 acre parcel in 
the preservation program and retain the option to build two family units instead of 
just one.  Thus it is possible that the nature of family lot allowances on preserved land 
increases the probability the landowner will not preserve the actual land on which an 
existing structure sits, but will take some initial action first, and as a result 
preservations will tend to show up in the data set as largely parcels with no housing 
structures.  
5.3.2 Competing Risks Results – Options Variables  
 
The variables of particular importance to this investigation are those 
associated with options – the two real options variables (drift and variance) and the 
dummy variable denoting the option to sell an easement. As presented in the 
theoretical section, the options pertaining to the fluctuation in housing prices, the drift 
and variance, should delay conversion decisions because the landowner will, in many 
cases, expect the return from waiting to be larger than the return to immediate 




when the development return is greater than the conversion cost, the options 
framework requires that development return exceed cost by some margin equivalent 
to the value of the option to develop in the future. In essence, an opportunity cost of 
development today is the foregone returns of development tomorrow at a potentially 
more advantageous price. Thus in areas where the variance in price is large, a 
landowner who includes current volatility into a forecast of the next period’s return 
may delay the conversion decision expecting an even better return in the next period.  
Similarly, for parcels qualified to enroll in a preservation easement, conversion today 
implies forfeiture of both the option to convert in the future and the option to preserve 
in the future. The expected result of a viable second option such as preservation is to 
delay conversion decisions.  
The coefficient related to the variance of the real option is consistently 
negative and significant across model specifications. A one percent increase in the 
price variation implies a 3 percent reduction in the hazard rate of conversion and a 
one standard deviation change in variance implies a 15% reduction. These results 
accord with the comparative statics from the real options literature and suggest that 
price volatility increases the propensity of the landowner to delay conversion 
decisions. The options variable related to the drift is consistently positive though 
never significant.  
The results pertaining to the second option are embodied in the estimated 
coefficient associated with easement eligibility (Easement). This coefficient is 
consistently negative and significant which suggests that preservation eligibility has 




The magnitude of this effect is better seen by taking the exponential of the 
coefficient, thus converting the coefficient to a hazard ratio.45  In this case the hazard 
ratios range from 50 percent in the piecewise model to 55 percent in the Gompertz 
model, implying that the rate of conversion for easement eligible parcels is 
approximately 45% to 50% less than what might be expected without an easement 
program.  
The coefficient itself suggests the importance of the easement but the 
reduction in the hazard rate may not be extremely useful to policy makers as the 
connection between the hazard rate and actual time periods is not transparent.  Table 
5.7 reports the predicted median conversion times for censored parcels in the analysis, 
broken down by easement qualification and parcel size. The first three columns 
display the predicted outcome using the piecewise specification for the conversion 
baseline hazard which projects the value from the last interval of the piecewise model 
into the future. This is a potential drawback of the piecewise specification. The results 
presented in the last three columns of Table 5.7 pertain to the Gompertz specification.  
                                                 
45 Strictly speaking, coefficients in unobserved heterogeneity models have the interpretation of hazard 
ratios only at t=0. As time progresses observations that are ‘ more frail’, as defined by the unobserved 
heterogeneity parameter, experience failure and are removed from the surviving population thus 
altering the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity among parcels remaining the sample. This 





Table 5.6  Predicted Median Conversion Times (by Parcel size) 




Not Qualified for 
Ease Difference 
>100 acres 14.97 7.54 7.43 
75-100 
acres 18.4 9.27 9.13 
50-75 acres 28.95 14.57 14.38 
25-50 acres 55.74 28.07 27.67 
 Gompertz Baseline 
>100 acres 23.15 14.1 9.05 
75-100 
acres 26.14 16.09 10.05 
50-75 acres 35.6 22.65 12.95 
25-50 acres 55.11 37.24 17.87 
Note:  All values in years and all ‘differences’ are significant at 5%. 
 
Comparing the median conversion time across models for large parcels (>100 
acres), the piecewise baseline competing risks model predicts median conversion time 
for the non-qualified parcels to be approximately 7.5 years and for the parcels 
qualified for the easement to be approximately 15 years.  The Gompertz specification 
produces a median conversion time of 14 nonqualified) versus 23 (qualified), for the 
same set of parcels. These large parcels are potentially the most interesting cases 
because they qualify for the easement without additional ‘help’ from adjacent parcels 
and because they yield the largest subdivisions and thus the greatest pressure on 
county services. However, differences in predicted conversion times persist over all 
size classes for both specifications and, range from 7.43 to 27.67 for the piecewise 




Figures 5.7 and 5.8 display the histograms of predicted median conversion 
times by easement qualification where both graphs are scaled so the sum of the areas 
equals one. The graphs exhibit different shapes, due to the baseline specification, but 
the distributional difference between qualified and non-qualified parcels within each 
graph is apparent. The distribution of qualified parcels is shifted to the right compared 
to those not qualified. These results suggest that the existence of a preservation 
program, and thus the option to preserve, may actually slow development of eligible 





Figure 5.7:  Predicted Median Conversion Times from Piecewise Bivariate 






Figure 5.8:  Predicted Median Conversion Times from Gompertz Bivariate 




Generally the results of the competing risks models are similar to the models 
which incorporate heterogeneity, as well as to the Cox model. Although the pattern of 
sign and significance is similar, it seems that as restrictions are removed in each step 
of the process, from fully parametric models to heterogeneity models to the 
competing risks models, the coefficient impacts are larger in absolute magnitude. As 
the results pertain to the primary variables of interest, i.e. the options variables, these 
more complicated (and more theoretically correct) estimation techniques lead to the 
same qualitative answers, which provide a comforting level of robustness in the 







Table 5.7  Competing risks models 















Normal   
Options variables  
Easement -0.6969 ** -0.6860 ** -0.6139 ** -0.5884 **  
Variance 
measure -0.0370 ** -0.0360 ** -0.0372 ** -0.0358 **  
Drift Measure -0.0187  -0.0184  -0.0086  -0.0069   
Development Returns  
distDC -0.0112  -0.0114  -0.0115  -0.0116   
distBA 0.0059  0.0057  0.0060  0.0056   
sluDevWithHs -0.0259 ** -0.0252 ** -0.0252 ** -0.0241 **  
sluDevNoHs -0.0155 ** -0.0149 ** -0.0152 ** -0.0142 **  
sluComm -0.0178 ** -0.0170 ** -0.0167 ** -0.0155 **  
sluSubdiv 0.0117  0.0114  0.0101  0.0099   
sluPreserved -0.0220 ** -0.0222 ** -0.0216 ** -0.0210 **  
sluOpen 0.0192 ** 0.0185 ** 0.0184 ** 0.0172 **  
sluRoad 0.0108 * 0.0105 * 0.0100 * 0.0093 *  
sluProtected 0.0018  0.0016  0.0015  0.0013   
sluExempt -0.0263 ** -0.0257 ** -0.0256 ** -0.0248 **  
devRate 0.0493 ** 0.0486 ** 0.0450 ** 0.0445 **  
popDen 0.2651  0.2514  0.2305  0.2110   
numLots 0.0009  0.0008  0.0007  0.0006   
reqOpenSpace -0.1506  -0.1587  -0.1638  -0.1625   
Opportunity costs  
class1 0.0128  0.0124  0.0126  0.0124   
class2 0.0023  0.0024  0.0023  0.0025   
class3 0.0004  0.0005  0.0005  0.0006   
class4 -0.0010  -0.0008  -0.0010  -0.0007   
agriculture -0.0033  -0.0033  -0.0031  -0.0031   
acres 0.3560 ** 0.3454 ** 0.3361 ** 0.3194 **  
hasHouse -1.1357 ** -1.0890 ** -1.0816 ** -1.0275 **  
Conversion costs  
steep -0.0080 ** -0.0076 ** -0.0075 ** -0.0070 **  
forested -0.0021  -0.0020  -0.0019  -0.0018   
notRoadSuit -0.0062 ** -0.0060 ** -0.0059 ** -0.0057 **  
notSepticSuit -0.0005  -0.0004  -0.0003  -0.0003   
sewerPlanned -0.9012 ** -0.8796 ** -0.8570 ** -0.8299 **  
intRate -0.1403  -0.1384  -0.1071 * -0.1059 *  
Apfo -0.0109  -0.0098  -0.1302  -0.1224   
          




Table 5.7 Competing Risks Models, continued. 















Normal   
Funded 1.9142 ** 1.7686 * 1.7994 * 1.9753 **  
Acres 0.1073 ** 0.1229 ** 0.1231 ** 0.1011 **  
distDC 0.0409  0.0494  0.0497  0.0388   
distBA -0.0096  -0.0096  -0.0095  -0.0091   
sluDevWithHs -0.0140  -0.0145  -0.0149  -0.0128   
sluDevNoHs 0.0166  0.0171  0.0169  0.0181   
sluComm 0.0030  0.0012  0.0015  0.0047   
sluSubdiv 0.0036  -0.0040  -0.0031  0.0061   
sluPreserved 0.0098  0.0125  0.0124  0.0094   
sluOpen -2.9817 * -2.9971  -3.0150  -2.7270 *  
sluRoad -0.1323 ** -0.1420 ** -0.1453 ** -0.1256 **  
sluProtected -0.0369  -0.0416  -0.0412  -0.0358   
sluExempt -0.0087  -0.0060  -0.0068  -0.0070   
class1 -0.0898 ** -0.1002 ** -0.1010 ** -0.0857 **  
class2 -0.1286 ** -0.1395 ** -0.1405 ** -0.1235 **  
class3 -0.1209 ** -0.1322 ** -0.1332 ** -0.1167 **  
class4 -0.0857 ** -0.0947 ** -0.0957 ** -0.0814 **  
Steep -0.0323 * -0.0336  -0.0340  -0.0302 *  
Forested 0.0203  0.0225  0.0219  0.0221   
agriculture 0.0417  0.0455  0.0449  0.0427   
hasHouse -2.9557 ** -3.2433 ** -3.2554 ** -2.8499 **  
          
Preservation 
Constant -0.5404  -0.3136  -0.1851  -1.1328   
Heterogeneity Parameters  
Heterogeneity 
parameter 1 1.0961 ** 1.4016 ** 1.3994 ** 0.9603 **  
Heterogeneity 
parameter 2   0.9865 ** 0.7879 **    
Correlation   0.5318  0.6638     










Modeling land conversion decisions is fraught with difficulties ranging from 
intensive data requirements to the appropriate choice of model structure. In many 
cases models to describe conversion decisions utilize aggregate data across time or 
space and place inappropriate restrictions on econometric specification.  
The analysis in this dissertation chapter extends the current literature in at 
least two directions. First, it utilizes a spatially and temporally explicit micro-level 
data set to demonstrate how to solve several of the modeling/econometric problems 
that have plagued analysis of these types of behavior for some time. To this author’s 
knowledge this is the first paper to utilize a multi-state model in a land use context 
and the first to consider the impacts of unobserved heterogeneity in the conversion 
timing decision.  
Models which remove parametric restrictions and incorporate individual 
heterogeneity are proposed and estimated. These complex models closely resemble 
the choice set a landowner is faced with in the county under study and may generalize 
to counties with similar programs. Estimation of the dependent competing risks 
model produces coefficient estimates similar to less complicated models with 
nonparametric baseline specifications or multiplicative individual unobserved 
heterogeneity, but the framework for the competing risks model can serve as a 
building block to forecast conversion decisions. At a minimum, the dependent 




models such as non-random censoring and the absence of length-biased sampling 
caused by individual unobserved heterogeneity. 
Second, it incorporates real options theory into the development decision 
modeling framework and finds that at least some of the theoretical predictions hold 
up in empirical work. Although there is no consensus in the literature about the 
appropriate form of a land conversion model, this work supports an argument that 
rejects the net present value approach as an adequate representation of land 
conversion. As predicted by real options theory, price volatility is found to slow 
conversion rates in the competing risks models as well as single risk semi–parametric 
baseline models with and without heterogeneity. In addition, the existence of an 
alternative real option (preservation) is found also to slow conversion. 
The primary goal of this work was to determine if an easement option impacts 
conversion decisions, and, if so, to quantify the temporal impact of the option on 
landowners that do not preserve. With each model, from single risk to competing risk, 
negative and significant impacts from the easement option are found. The magnitude 
of the impact on the conversion rate ranges from a 45% to a 50% reduction in the 
conversion hazard. The less parametric and more realistic models produce the largest 
estimated impacts.  
This analysis finds empirical support for the predictions of the theoretical real 
options literature in terms of the effect of high price volatility and that of multiple 
options. However, one should be somewhat cautious in making interpretative 
statements about some of the control variables in these models because, as in many 




example, the distance measures are likely correlated with the surrounding land use 
measures as well as zoning variables such as number of lots. Additionally, as outlined 
by Irwin (1998) there is ample opportunity for endogeneity in the spatial landscape. It 
is for these reasons that the next chapters of this dissertation will utilize a technique 
specifically designed to account for endogeneity to examine a second question: 





6. Measuring the Preservation “Spillover Effect” 
 
Many of the control variables utilized in the hazard models in Chapter 5 are 
generated as a result of policy decisions made by the county in the past, and one may 
be tempted to interpret their respective coefficients as estimated policy impacts. 
However one should be cautious because, as in most land use datasets, there is likely 
correlation among covariates and the potential for selection problems. This chapter 
will examine a policy relevant variable from the hazard model that deals with the 
development response to neighboring preservation activity. On the surface, one would 
expect the coefficient on the surrounding preserved land measure to provide clues 
concerning the development response to neighboring preservation.   But it cannot 
ensure causation and thus does not address the important policy question: “does 
preservation attract development?”  In the subsequent sections will explain the 
potential bias in this interpretation, suggest and implement an alternative estimation 
strategy which deals with the potential biases, and discuss implications and results. 
For convenience, the impact of preservation activity on neighboring parcels is 
referred to as the spillover effect in the remainder of this analysis. 
Chapter 4 introduced the notion of interaction effects in the description of the 
surrounding land use variables. The spillover effect is one such interaction effect. 
Interaction effects arise because surrounding land use has an effect on the value of a 
parcel in a given land use, and thus surrounding land use will also have an effect on 
the likelihood of a parcel being developed. In the presence of these interaction effects, 




likelihood of development of parcels other than those directly affected by the policy. 
Based on this reasoning surrounding land use measures are included in the hazard 
models, and these potential interaction effects seem to be confirmed by the 
significance of the coefficients from those models.   But these coefficients should not 
be interpreted in the context of a policy evaluation where the interaction effect is the 
pathway which the policy is expected to influence the outcome. The pattern of 
surrounding land uses may arise from interaction effects or from other spatially 
correlated and unobserved exogenous landscape features. It is worth noting that these 
variables are included in the hazard model as predetermined variables because they 
are lagged measures, but the interpretation of these variables as purely interaction 
effects should be made with caution. This issue is especially relevant when the 
surrounding land use is a direct result of a policy, as is the case with the land use in 
preservation. If it is true that preservation deters development, as suggested by the 
negative coefficients on sluPreserved in the hazard model, then this preservation 
program appears to have little downside. But if the opposite is true then the program 
may have the unintended consequence of attracting development and encouraging 
further fragmentation of the landscape.  
There are at least two sources of bias present in the hazard model relating to 
the coefficient on neighboring preservation (sluPreserved) as this coefficient relates 
to a direct policy interpretation.   The first potential form of bias is best described as a 
selection issue. Empirically speaking this may be best explained using terminology 
associated with a controlled experiment. In a controlled experiment subjects are 




treatment can be estimated by comparing the difference in a measured outcome 
variable between the two groups. In this case the treatment is neighboring a preserved 
parcel and the outcome of interest is the subsequent observed conversion activity. 
When we attempt to deduce treatment impacts using actual outcomes, however, it is 
easy to see that there exists an assignment problem. Parcels are obviously not 
randomly assigned to treatment and control groups and thus in the treatment context 
the act of neighboring a preserved parcel is not an exogenous attribute of a parcel. In 
fact, parcels most likely to be treated have observable attributes that distinguish them 
from those parcels that are not likely to receive the treatment. These same attributes 
are included as covariates in the hazard model of conversion and are shown to be 
significant in the analysis of the conversion decision. So, the hazard models fail to 
account for this selection issue in estimation of the coefficient on surrounding land 
preservation. To evaluate a policy specific outcome, such as the spillover effect, it is 
best to compare “apples to apples”. That is, one needs to compare only similar parcels 
from the treatment and control groups to one another and thus account for this 
selection on observables.  
A second form of bias exists in the hazard models because the surrounding 
land use measure (sluPreserved) includes all preservation activity dating back to 
1980. Therefore, to adequately measure the impact of surrounding preservation 
activity one would need to model conversion decisions starting in 1980. The fact that 
we cannot do this because of data limitations leads to a starting point bias.   As an 
example, consider a parcel that is preserved in 1983 and has two developable 




The preservation status of the first parcel will be present in the data set, but because 
the study period begins in 1990, the development activity will be missed.  Because of 
the inherent sampling problem associated with the starting point bias, the more 
developable the neighboring parcel of this preservation, the more likely it will already 
have been developed by the onset of the study period. The data set used in this 
dissertation will only report that the sole developable neighbor of the preserved parcel 
does not develop and will miss the 1988 conversion. As a result the sample will 
contain a disproportionate number of parcels which neighbor preservation and have 
attributes that tend to decrease the chances they will convert, perhaps ever, creating 
an additional selection issue. By itself, this feature of the data may lead to the 
negative coefficients observed in the hazard models for sluPreserved. 
In order to evaluate the spillover effect of preservation activity the non-
random assignment problem is addressed using a class of estimators called propensity 
score estimators and starting point bias is addressed by reformulating the data to 
evaluate only preservation and conversion activity during the study period. But first 
the source and direction of the spillover effect are discussed in detail.  
6.1 Spillover Effects   
 
The aim of this chapter is to test whether a spillover effect exists between 
preserved parcels and neighboring development decisions. Specifically: does having a 
preserved neighbor alter a parcel’s likelihood of subsequently being developed?  
There are several reasons why a spillover effect may exist between developable 




which can be individually identified. On the one hand, a farmer with a neighbor who 
has preserved his land may find it more profitable to remain in farming for all the 
reasons that ‘right to farm’ laws have been instituted. Nuisance complaints from 
equipment noise, manure odors, and chemical releases are less likely to occur, and 
support industries are more likely to survive in the area. On the other hand, 
agricultural enterprises that depend on marketing to the public may find it profitable 
to have residential neighbors. Landscape horticultural enterprises and pick-your-own 
farm operations could possibly benefit from developments close by.  
The effect of a preserved neighbor on the profitability of development is 
equally uncertain. The proximity of services and shopping is often considered an 
advantageous feature for residential development and a greater mass of residential 
development is likely to encourage commercial services in the area. Thus the more 
preserved land in the area the less the critical mass of households and the lower the 
levels of services, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, neighboring land that is 
permanently preserved in open space could provide positive spillovers in terms of 
rural amenities (e.g. scenic views) and low levels of congestion and traffic noise. As 
the likelihood of development depends in part on a) the willingness to pay of 
households for housing in a given location and b) the profitability of the existing 
undeveloped uses (e.g. farming), the relative sizes of the potential spillover effects 
described above may be important in determining where development takes place. 
Testing a hypothesis about these components of the spillover effect is 
surprisingly difficult. Regression-type analyses of land use interactions suffer from 




in socio-economic behavior. Irwin (1998) and Irwin and Bockstael (2002) illustrate 
the problems that arise in trying to identify spillover effects between neighboring land 
uses. They suggest that because many of the factors that make development more or 
less profitable are spatially correlated, the empirical finding of more development 
adjacent to existing development is not evidence of a positive interaction effect. Such 
an outcome could easily arise simply because both parcels are characterized by 
similar levels of the factors that affect development profitability, such as commuting 
distance to employment centers, road frontage, suitability of soils for development, 
etc. In testing whether preservation affects neighboring parcels’ likelihood of 
development, these sorts of identification problems will be encountered as well.  
In summary, the spillover effects of preservation on development are likely to 
be both positive and negative. For example, spatial correlation in factors affecting 
development suggests a potential negative relationship between development 
decisions and neighboring preservation. However, positive externalities generated by 
open space in the presence of nearby residential uses suggest a potential positive 
impact of neighboring preservation on development decisions. The estimator 
proposed in the next section attempts to measure the sum total of these spillover 
effects and only if strong positive spillover effects exist between preservation and 
development would one expect to find a positive empirical effect of preservation on 






6.2 Propensity Score Matching 
 
The next few subsections will outline the implementation of a propensity 
score estimator and highlight the advantages and drawbacks of the approach. In this 
framework, this analysis wishes to test for, and measure, the treatment effect where 
the observation of interest is a developable parcel, the treatment is the preservation of 
a neighbor, and the outcome of interest is whether the developable parcel is developed 
or not over a specified time period following the preservation action. This is a non-
random selection process because, as has been argued, developable parcels that have 
preserved neighbors are likely to have, on average, different characteristics than 
parcels without such neighbors, and these different characteristics may alter the 
likelihood of development. 
Conventional analyses, such as the hazard model reported in the previous 
chapters, might attempt to control for these characteristics by entering them, together 
with the treatment variable, into a model that seeks to explain the outcome. But 
criticisms of this type of approach are now standard, and include concern over 
reliance on linear or simple functional forms and over failure of the common support 
(cases where treated observations are substantially different from untreated 
observations). Alternatives for improving the rigor of the statistical test include 
procedures that estimate treatment effects by matching treated and untreated 
observations on conditioning variables and excluding observations that are 




As an example of how the common support issue might arise in this data, 
consider the case where a parcel has attributes that make it highly valued as a 
subdivision and then has a neighbor that enters the preservation program. If a parcel 
with similar attributes but no bordering preservation does not exist in the data set, 
then the counterfactual does not exist and non-parametric identification is not 
possible.  This is referred to as failure of the common support. Evaluation of the 
treatment effect in this case is only possible in the regression context because the 
functional form of the regression equation will estimate a counterfactual in these 
regions of sparse data.  
In essence the regression function imposes a parametric relationship between 
the covariates in the model and the outcome of interest in order to construct this 
counterfactual. Similar to the work of Black and Smith (2004) there is no theoretical 
argument for the functional form of the outcome equations in this land conversion 
context, and thus it is inappropriate to rely on a linear or any other specific functional 
form to predict this counterfactual. The propensity score approach allows the 
researcher to identify these anomalies and use only parcels with counterparts in the 
control group to estimate the treatment effect. To reiterate, propensity score methods 
do not solve this issue, they allow it to be addressed by excluding those observations 
which fail the common support.  
6.2.1 Propensity Score Matching – The Basics 
 
Propensity score-matching estimators were first suggested by Rosenbaum and 




the literature, especially in labor economics where the evaluation of job training 
programs represents a significant challenge (such as Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 
1997; Dehejia and Wahba 2002; Lechner 2002; Smith and Todd 2005a). Following 
common notation, Y1 is the outcome under treatment and Y0 is the outcome with no 
treatment. For any parcel, only one of these outcomes can be observed. D = 1 
indicates that the parcel is in the set of parcels that has been treated, and D=0 
indicates it is in the untreated set. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) identify a measurable 
quantity of interest, defined by the following equation: 
(23)  ( ) ( ) ( )1|1|1| 0101 =−===−= DYEDYEDYYEATT   
where ATT  is ‘the average treatment on the treated’. This equals the expected value 
of the difference between the treated outcome and the non-treated outcome, for the 
particular group of parcels that happened to get treated. For this analysis this is the 
effect on the likelihood of development of having a newly preserved neighbor, 
averaged over all parcels that were treated. The first term on the right hand side of 
(23) is easily obtained; it is the percentage of treated parcels that develop. The second 
term on the right hand side represents the counterfactual – the outcome a treated 
parcel would have received had it not been treated. Since a parcel can be in only one 
state, treated or control, the matching procedure boils down to an  estimate of 
E(Y0|D=1), which is unobservable.  
Matching estimators pair each treated observation with 1 or more 
observationally similar non-treated observations, using the conditioning variables, Z, 
to identify the similarity. This procedure is justified if it can be argued that 




those parcels found in the set D=1 were actually not treated, the expected value of 
their outcomes, once conditioned on the Z's, would not differ from the expected value 
of outcomes in the current group of untreated observations. More precisely, 
conditional mean independence is required, such that: 
(24)    ( ) ( )0,|1,| 00 === DZYEDZYE     
Rosenbaum and Rubin’s (1983) method for resolving the non-random assignment 
problem is based on this idea.   They argue that if treatment is determined by some set 
of covariates, Z, one can establish a control group that is similar in Z relative to the 
treatment group. They formally state this as: 
(25)  ( ) ( ) ( )0,|1,|1,| 0101 =−===− DZYEDZYEDZYYE .   
Direct implementation of equation (25) would be difficult for a large number 
of conditioning variables.46 Yet ensuring that equation (24) holds requires a rich set of 
these variables which should include all variables that influence the probability of 
treatment and outcome of interest. This led to the seminal contribution of Rosenbaum 
and Rubin’s 1983 paper. They proved that instead of conditioning on all K elements 
of the Z vector individually, one can equivalently condition on a one-dimensional 
function of that vector. They show that if outcome Y0 is independent of selection 
when conditioned on the Z's, then it is also independent of selection when conditioned 
on the propensity score which is defined as the probability of selection conditioned on 
the Z's or more formally: 
(26)     ( ) ( )ZDZP |1Pr == .     
 
                                                 




Rosenbaum and Rubin also require that there be no single Z or combination of 
Z variables that guarantees treatment. Put another way, for any set of Z, the 
probability of treatment must be strictly less than 1, i.e. Pr(D = 1| Z) < 1 for all Z . 
This condition must be true for each treated observation to have the potential of an 
analogue among the untreated. Thus, the impact of being treated is only valid for 
observations within the common support where the distribution of propensity scores 
for treated and control observations overlap.  
Equation (23) can now be rewritten as, 
(27)  ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )0,|1,|1,| 0101 =−===−= DZPYEDZPYEDZPYYEATT .  
 
In practice, equation (26) is estimated as a binary probit or logit, with the treatment 
dummy as the dependent variable. Explanatory variables include factors that are 
expected to affect the probability of treatment and those that are expected to affect 
outcomes directly and may be correlated with treatment. This works well in the land 
conversion context because, as discussed in the previous chapters, the variables that 
are expected to influence preservation activity are often the same variables expected 
to impact the conversion decision.  
With these propensity scores in hand, several ways exist to construct the 
counterfactual or the last term in equation (27), including kernel estimates, k-nearest 
neighbor, and caliper based techniques. Based on results from a Monte Carlo study by 
Frölich, kernel estimates will be employed. Kernel estimates use a weighted average 
of all or a subset of control observations to construct the counterfactual for each 




group of comparable j non-treated observations using their respective P(Z).  In order 
to match observations, a weight, W(i,j), is constructed from the kernel function, K(·).  
The kernel function used is the Epanechnikov kernel because it combines desirable 
properties from the tricube (i.e. dropping influence from the distribution’s tails) and 
the normal kernels (i.e. weighting close observations, in P(Z), more heavily and 
smoothly diminishing the weight with distance) (Smith and Todd 2005a).47   This 
allows the matching of the outcome of the set of treated parcels to the 'kernel 
weighted' outcome of an appropriate set of the D = 0 control group. This will 
construct the counterfactual and estimate the average treatment effect of the treated, 
TTA
)
.   
Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997) and Smith and Todd (2005a) provide 
the following formal exposition: 
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N1 is the number of treated observations and h is the bandwidth of the kernel. The 
kernel choice, as suggested by DiNardo and Tobias (2001), has less impact on the 
                                                 




estimated weight, W(i,j), than does the choice of bandwidth (h). More bias and less 
variance are associated with higher values of h, and less bias and more variance are 
associated with lower values of h.  Again following (Frölich 2004), the optimal 
bandwidth is found through the “leave-one-out” method of cross validation.  To 
perform “leave-one-out’ cross validation, one observation at a time is left out of the 
analysis. With a specific bandwidth and kernel the value of the dropped observation is 
predicted. This is done for each observation in the sample, in turn, and the prediction 
errors are collected. Formally, if jy0 is the outcome of the j
th observation then the 
prediction error is jj yy 00 ˆ−  where jy0ˆ is the kernel based estimate of the outcome. 





∑ =∈ −Dj jj yyN  for each 
bandwidth on the grid search, where N0 is the number of observations in the control 
group.48  The “optimal” bandwidth is the one that produces the minimum mean 
squared error.  
The strength of propensity score matching is that it exposes regions in which 
the support of Z does not overlap for treated and untreated observations. For example, 
there may be no untreated observations with propensity scores in the range of high 
values of P(Zi). When this is the case, the matching procedure is defensible only over 
the region of the common support. Treated observations outside the common support 
are dropped from the analysis, and the parameter TTA
)
is an estimate of the treatment 
effect on the treated only over the range of the common support. 
                                                 





7. Application of Propensity Score Matching  
 
An important policy impact of any land preservation program is the impact on 
surrounding parcels, what has been described as the spillover effect in this paper. 
Policies that alter land uses produce spillover effects if they positively or negatively 
impact the probability of conversion of neighboring parcels. In this context the 
Howard County farmland preservation program, which enrolls parcels in perpetuity, 
may have the further effect of discouraging development in areas neighboring 
preservation or, conversely, the unintended consequence of attracting development 
into the very areas the county wishes to reduce development pressures. 
Econometrically, the spillover effect is difficult to measure with regression 
techniques because treated parcels, those that neighbor a new preservation, are not 
randomly assigned and thus the treatment is not exogenous but is correlated with 
other measurable parcel attributes. Propensity score estimators address this 
assignment, or selection, problem by predicting the probability of treatment, 
conditional on observables, then matching parcels across treatment and control 
groups by their propensity scores to form an estimate of the treatment effect.  
Using experimental and non-experimental comparison data, Heckman, Ichimura 
and Todd (1997) and Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998) concluded that 
criteria for matching estimators to have a low bias include:  
• The conditioning variables should represent a rich set of factors related to both 




• The treated and untreated observations should be drawn from the same 
underlying population; 
• The dependent outcome variable should be measured in the same way over 
treatment and control groups. 
 
These conditions arise from the fact that the majority of matching tests have been 
applied to labor market data where treated and untreated samples are often drawn 
from completely different data sources, neither of which have very rich sets of 
individual characteristics. This land use problem poses no obvious biases from these 
sources. Treated and untreated observations are all members of the set of developable 
parcels in Howard County. Outcomes are measured for both groups using the same 
data acquisition and processing procedures, and extensive data (at least relative to 
many labor market studies) are available for each parcel for use as conditioning 
variables. Arguments based on economic theory and institutional knowledge inform 
the choice of conditioning variables in the land use problem.  
It should be noted that the propensity score approach is not a silver bullet and 
comes with its own drawbacks for this land use problem. Posing the hypothesis about 
spillover effects in a treatment effects setting is not straightforward because of the 
dynamic nature of the development and preservation processes and the static nature of 
the propensity score matching tests. The propensity score approach, by design, 
estimates the probability of treatment based on the state of the landscape prior to 
treatment. The outcome, the observed conversion decision, must then be measured 




the dynamic nature of the development environment is missing in the propensity 
score approach. Due to the static nature of the propensity score estimator all time-
varying variables as of the beginning of the study period and to exclude the options 
variables for variance and drift are excluded from the analysis.  
Additionally, the data set is limited to only those parcels in the western part of 
the county because the probability of neighboring a preserved parcel is virtually zero 
for the parcels not in the west. All parcels in this subset of the data are located outside 
the sewer boundary so the variable for sewer planned is dropped from the analysis. 
Also eliminated is the incidence of adequate public facilities ordinances because this 
variable changes from year to year. Covariates with this much variation over time 
cannot be accommodated in the static propensity score framework.   An additional 
variable is added to the analysis - a dummy variable to indicate if the parcel has a 
neighbor that qualifies for an easement (sEasement).  The surrounding land use radii 
are expanded to 400 meters in order to detect development pressure for multiple years 
of conversion decisions. In the hazard model the 100 meter buffer was used because it 
was updateable each year and the conversion decision was analyzed each year not 
aggregated over many years as is necessary in this model. A complete list of data and 
summary statistics for the utilized in the propensity score analysis are given in Table 
7.1.  
Table 7.1  Summary Statistics –Propensity Score Analysis 
Variable Obs. Mean Min Max 
Easement 605 0.3471 0 1 
sEasement 605 0.3851 0 1 
     
distDC 605 50.8241 29.5114 69 
distBA 605 39.1997 23.6942 73 




sluDevWithHs 605 29.2921 0.3885 80 
sluDevNoHs 605 23.2532 0 88 
sluComm 605 1.3988 0 33 
sluSubdiv 605 7.1199 0 39 
sluPreserved 605 5.7642 0 67 
sluOther 605 2.6145 0 60 
sluOpen 605 0.3343 0 35 
sluRoad 605 4.7551 0 41 
sluProtected 605 5.0918 0 68 
sluExempt 605 1.0852 0 49 
numLots 605 11.0661 3 95 
reqOpenSpace 605 0.7058 0 1 
     
class1 605 3.3490 0 67 
class2 605 53.8708 0 100 
class3 605 25.0245 0 85 
class4 605 13.5739 0 86 
agriculture 605 56.7937 0 100 
acres 605 49.469 4.294 430 
hasHouse 605 0.4893 0 1 
     
steep 605 9.7439 0 99 
forested 605 32.8115 0 100 
notRoadSuit 605 36.1646 0 100 
notSepSuit 605 43.4757 0 100 
 
Two experimental evaluations are implemented. In each the treatment is defined as 
the preservation of a neighbor during the years 1990-1992.49  This particular 
treatment definition was selected in part because a large group of parcels were 
preserved in 1990-1992. The two alternative outcomes are  a) whether the parcel was 
developed during a short run period (from 1992 through 1997) and b) whether the 
parcel was developed during in a longer term period (from 1992 through 2001), both 
following a neighboring preservation action. The observation set includes any parcel 
                                                 
49
 Data on all preservation decisions back to the program’s inception in the early 1980’s are available, 
allowing inclusion of 1990 as well as 1991 preservation decisions in this treatment. Data on 




in the western part of the county that was developable as of 1991. Subsequent 
development decisions during the duration of the study period can then be examined.  
The first step of the procedure is to calculate the propensity score by 
estimating the probability that a parcel is treated as a function of factors that affect the 
likelihood of treatment and factors that affect the outcome (i.e. development). The 
factors that are hypothesized to affect the likelihood of treatment are almost identical 
to those that have already argued should affect the development decision. However, a 
treated parcel is one that has a preserved neighbor, not one that is preserved itself. 
Nonetheless, parcel attributes are identified that are expected to affect preservation 
decisions to determine how they may be reinterpreted as factors affecting treatment. 
Recall that Howard County sets out specific criteria for ranking parcels for easement 
purchases. The county assigns a higher score to the application, 
• the more agricultural or forested land in the vicinity of the parcel; 
• the more active the agricultural operations on the parcel; 
• the more protected land in the area; 
• the larger the parcel size; 
• the fewer acres subject to erosion or drainage problems on the parcel; 
• the greater the proportion of LCC class 1, class 2, and class 3 soils on the 
parcel; 
• and the greater the road frontage;  
Although these criteria are intended to apply to the parcel being considered for 
preservation, many are characteristics that apply to that parcel’s surrounding land use 




among neighboring parcels. Therefore, there is every reason to expect a selection 
problem. To be more specific, in attempting to measure the effect on parcel A’s 
development decision from having a neighbor, B, preserve, one needs to take into 
account the fact that features of the landscape that make B more likely to preserve 
will be a land use description of the neighborhood of both A and B, as well as 
physical and environmental characteristics of B that are likely not to vary much 
across the neighborhood of A and B. And, what is more, these very features are 
factors likely to affect the probability of development, as well. The variables that 
should help explain the probability of treatment clearly overlap almost exactly with 
the set that affects the development outcome. Fortunately, propensity score matching 
does not require separating out the effects of various explanatory variables on the 
outcome and the likelihood of being treated, but only that the analysis controls for 
them in testing for the treatment effect. Because of this, matching methods for 
estimating treatment effects seem particularly well-suited to deal with this otherwise 
confusing and confounding problem. 
7.1 Results 
 
The results of the initial specifications of the probit estimation are given in 
Table 7.2.50  Interpretation is complicated by the fact that the variables are measured 
for the developable parcel and are included to explain whether that parcel is treated in 
the sense that a neighbor preserves. The probit does not directly estimate the 
probability of preservation but instead the probability of treatment, but these will be 
                                                 
50 The full balanced specification included acres squared and the variable for surrounding land use in a 




similar for variables that are correlated in space. Fortunately, interpretation of net 
effects is not necessary in constructing propensity scores and correlation among 
covariates causes no particular problems. 
Table 7.2  Propensity score estimates 
Variables  Coefficients   
Options variables 
Easement -0.2208  
sEasement 0.6613 ** 
Development Returns 
distDC 0.0200 ** 
distBA 0.0082  
sluDevWithHs 0.0177 ** 
sluDevNoHs 0.0511 ** 
sluComm -0.0167  
sluSubdiv -0.0004  
sluPreserved 0.0057  
sluOpen -0.0087  
sluRoad -0.3657 * 
sluProtected -0.0258  
sluExempt -0.0299 ** 
numLots 0.0109 ** 
reqOpenSpace -0.1532  
Opportunity costs 
class1 -0.0159  
class2 -0.0064  
class3 0.0033  
class4 -0.0090  
agriculture 0.0109 ** 
acres 0.4477  
hasHouse 0.0371  
Conversion costs 
steep -0.0094 * 
forested 0.0093  
notRoadSuit 0.0109  
notSepticSuit -0.0075  
   
Constant -4.2256 ** 
N = 605 Psuedo R2 = 0.308  




Once having obtained the propensity scores, the common support condition can be 
examined. Figure 7.1 provides the histogram of propensity scores for the treated and 
non-treated groups for both quasi-experiments. The x-axis measures the value of the 
predicted propensity score, calculated from the results of the probit analysis. The y-
axis measures the percent of each sample (treated and non-treated) found in each 
predicted propensity score interval of approximately 5 percentage points. Intervals 
for which there are treated observations but no non-treated observations available for 
controls are intervals over which the common support fails. 




Before calculating the average treatment on the treated, TTA
)
, the outcome 




propensity score. Given the conditional independence assumption set out in (24) 
above, this requires ensuring that the covariates in Z meet this condition, which is 
equivalent to achieving 'balance' between treatments and their controls. In layman’s 
terms, balancing ensures that covariates in Z cannot be used to predict membership in 
the treatment or control group, i.e. the ideal situation of a random assignment has 
been recreated. Several balancing tests exist in the literature. The test used – 
commonly called regression based balancing – is suggested by Smith and Todd 
(2005a) and explained in more detail in Smith and Todd (2005b). The intuition 
behind this test is that after conditioning on P(Z), any further conditioning on the Z 
vector should not provide new information on D, the treatment assignment. In other 
words, the balancing tests evaluate whether covariates in Z are informative of 
treatment assignment after conditioning on the propensity score.51  If differences 
remain, then this suggests the propensity score model is mis-specified. Following 
Dehejia and Wahba (2002), cross products and squares of covariates are added to the 
specification until balancing is achieved.  
Two features of balancing are important to note. First, it may not be possible 
to achieve balancing in some problems. Second, the balancing test does not provide a 
means of selecting conditioning variables; it only assures that any predictive power of 
treatment classification in the selected variables is squeezed out of the set of variables 
that is available. After balancing the covariates in Z, the propensity score calculated 
from Z is no longer informative as to which parcels are in the treatment or control 
                                                 
51 Operationally, each covariate in regressed on the propensity score, the treatment dummy, the 
propensity score squared and cubed, and the propensity score, squared and cubed, interacted with the 
treatment dummy.  The F test of all variables containing the treatment dummy equal to zero provides 




group.  In essence the procedure has recreated a random experiment. The final 
specification passes the balancing test suggested by Smith and Todd, when applied to 
the observations in the common support.52 
The treatment is defined as having a neighbor that preserves in 1990-92, and 
the short run outcome measure is conversion after treatment and before 1997.53  The 
eligible set includes only those developable parcels not treated before 1990 and 
includes 605 observations of which 12 are dropped because of a common support 
violation and 113 remain in the treated set. The remaining developable parcels are in 
the control set. The second quasi-experiment evaluates the outcome over a longer 
time horizon, from 1991 – 2001. In this experiment, fewer parcels drop from the 
common support (only one), because the optimal bandwidth is slightly wider for the 
longer outcome window.   Table 7.3 reports the number of treated and untreated 
observations for each quasi-experiment and the number of observations that fall on 
the common support. 
Table 7.3  Common Support Results  
Conversion Time Lag – 5 years 
 On Support Off Support 
Treated 113 12 
Controls 480 0 
Conversion Time Lag – 10 years 
 On Support Off Support 
Treated 124 1 
Controls 480 0 
 
 
 The results of the matching tests for both quasi-experiments are found in Table 7.4. 
The first column reports information about actual outcomes – specifically the percent 
of treated and untreated parcels that ultimately develop within each specified time 
                                                 
52 Output for the balancing tests is quite lengthy and thus available by request. 




frame. For example, for the short run timeframe, 12.80% of the sample of parcels 
with neighbors that preserve in 1990-92 developed in the period from 1992 to 1997. 
In contrast, 13.75% of those parcels that were not treated developed between 1992 
and 1997. For the longer outcome timeframe, 19.20% of the sample of parcels treated 
ultimately developed by 2001 and 22.29% of the untreated developed.  
 
Table 7.4  Average Treatment Effects 
Conversion Time Lag – 5 year 
 Unmatched Kernel Estimate 
Treated    12.80            13.27 
Controls -  13.75                          -  4.84 
Difference    -0.95          TTA
)
    8.43** 
   
Conversion Time Lag – 10 years 
 Unmatched Kernel Estimate 
Treated     19.20             19.35 
Controls -  22.29          -  10.78 
Difference     -3.09      TTA
)
     8.57** 
Note: Significance levels based on 1,000 bootstrapped repetitions are: **: 5%, *: 10%.  
The bandwidths are 0.01095 for 5 year lag and 0.0471 for the 10 year lag. 
Kernel estimate is based on the Epanechnikov kernel. 
 
The column marked ‘Kernel Estimate’ reports matching results for the 
Epanechnikov kernel matching algorithm. The first number reports the proportion of 
treated parcels that ultimately develop for the parcels that remain after eliminating 
those treated observations that violate the common support condition. The second 
item in this column reports the mean counterfactual. This is a re-weighted average 
value of the binary outcome, where the weights are defined as in equation (29).  
The difference between the percent of actual treated and untreated parcels that 
subsequently convert is small, in both the short and long run experiments. These 




treated parcels show no greater propensity to develop than do control parcels. 
However, when the matching procedure is employed which involves limiting the 
treated set to those on the common support and comparing these treated parcels only 
with similar control parcels, the difference is much larger (8.43 percent and 8.57 
percent for the short and long term experiment, respectively). This suggests that 
parcels that neighbor preservation were more than three times as likely as their 
control counterparts to develop within the short run period of five years following 
neighboring preservation and almost twice as likely during the ten year period. The 
decline in the difference in treatment effect with the longer time horizon suggests that 
any effect due to neighboring preservation declines with time.54  To determine 
significance of the TTA
)
 estimates, bootstrapped standard errors are calculated with 
1,000 repetitions. In both the short and long term cases, the TTA
)
is significant at the 
5% level.  
Table 7.5 illustrates the ability of the matching estimator to mimic a 
controlled experiment. First compare columns 2 and columns 4 which are the raw 
means of the covariates by treatment status. There are large differences in the acreage 
(acres), amount of land in agriculture (agriculture), percentage of lands with steep 
slopes (steep), surrounding lands in farmsteads (sluDevWithHs, sluDevNoHs), as well 
as easement eligibility of the own parcel and neighbors’ parcels (sEasement). 
Columns 6 and 8, under the heading “After Matching”, display the same variables 
limited to the common support and using the weighted control observations. Notice 
the similarity now between acreage (55 acres for the treated versus 56 acres for 
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controls), percentage of land in agriculture (66% treated versus 68% controls), 
amount of surrounding lands in farmsteads (31% versus 31%), own parcel easement 
eligibility (49% versus 45% for controls), and neighbors’ eligibility (64% versus 63% 
controls). In summary, this table illustrates the power of the matching estimation 
procedure to convert a non-random assignment problem into one that approaches a 
randomized method. It compares treatment and weighted control observations that are 
very similar in observable covariates addressing the selection problems inherent in 
enrollment and the reliance on the functional form of a regression approach to 
evaluate a treatment outcome. 
Table 7.5:  Summary Statistics by Treatment Status (for the 5 year conversion time lag) 







Parcels Untreated Parcels 





Variable Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Easement 0.5360 0.2979 0.4956 0.4573 
sEasement 0.6800 0.3083 0.6460 0.6324 
     
distDC 54.8163 49.7845 54.5850 54.3459 
distBA 41.1578 38.6898 41.0783 40.2384 
     
sluDevWithHs 32.7515 28.3911 31.6471 31.0966 
sluDevNoHs 31.0519 21.2223 31.3326 31.7939 
sluComm 0.6221 1.6010 0.6871 0.7129 
sluSubdiv 5.6651 7.4987 5.7150 6.1485 
sluPreserved 8.3900 5.0804 8.4643 8.6221 
sluOther 1.3591 2.9414 1.4568 1.5516 
sluOpen 0.0408 0.4108 0.0451 0.0546 
sluRoad 3.3440 5.1226 3.5002 3.7935 
sluProtected 2.2470 5.8327 2.3354 2.0190 
sluExempt 0.2625 1.2995 0.2903 0.2989 
numLots 13.3360 10.4750 12.2832 12.3539 
reqOpenSpace 0.8000 0.6813 0.7788 0.7816 
     
class1 3.4122 3.3325 3.3704 2.9476 




class3 26.8231 24.5561 26.1902 27.6638 
class4 13.8549 13.5007 14.6862 12.9518 
agriculture 67.4830 54.0100 66.8907 68.4552 
Acres 60.597 46.571 55.794 56.206 
hasHouse 0.4640 0.4958 0.4690 0.4395 
     
Steep 4.5002 11.1094 4.6943 4.8946 
forested 28.1272 34.0313 28.3235 27.1504 
notRoadSuit 35.4083 36.3616 36.1388 36.3186 
notSepSuit 38.4003 44.7975 39.0636 38.9852 
     
Observations  125 480 113 452 
Weighted Number of Observations 113 
Note: 1 – Weighted using the kernel weights from the Epanechnikov kernel. 
 
7.2 Conclusion  
 
Testing the effects of policies and programs on land use decisions is not an 
easy task. This is especially true when the effect being tested is some type of spatial 
interaction. Because the landscape is characterized by so much spatial correlation, it 
is empirically difficult to distinguish between true interactions between outcomes, 
and outcomes that are correlated because they are affected by correlated exogenous 
variables. In other words, it is difficult to provide evidence of causation as opposed to 
correlation. 
Following matching methods developed in the labor literature, propensity 
score matching is used to test for a treatment effect. As pointed out, it is not possible 
to design a quasi-controlled experiment that tests the same hypothesis as is tested in 
the hazard model because the hazard simulates a dynamic process while the matching 
tests are essentially static. In the matching framework, two outcomes are considered, 
one that tests the effect of the preservation actions on subsequent development in the 




propensity score matching method reveals significant effects from treatment. Parcels 
with preserved neighbors are significantly more likely to develop subsequent to their 
neighbor’s preservation than those without such a treatment. However, the difference 
in the calculated treatment effect in the short and long run experiments is very small 
suggesting that the spillover effect occurs quickly and remained stable into the long 
run. The size of the effect is estimated to be about 8.5% - that is developable parcels 
in the western part of Howard County are about 8% more likely to developable if a 
neighbor preserved than a counterpart with no preserving neighbor. 
This chapter provides evidence for the contention that preserved open space is 
likely to induce more neighboring development, holding other things equal. Thus 
preservation programs, if not designed carefully, may actually encourage landscape 
fragmentation by setting in motion a path dependent process that encourages a 
checkerboard pattern of preservation and development. Knowing of the existence of 
this spillover effect may help the public sector design land use policies with a higher 





8. What Does It All Mean? 
 
This dissertation quantifies two outcomes of a voluntary easement program 
designed to preserve farmland in perpetuity. One outcome, an induced delay in 
conversion timing, is unexpected and desirable for a county attempting to control the 
pace of development. The second is an unintended consequence, i.e. a negative 
impact, because it suggests that preserved lands attract development activity. This 
unintended consequence may be unavoidable but should be quantified if one wishes 
to evaluate the true impact of a land preservation program or design a policy to 
minimize this effect.  
A primary goal of this dissertation was to determine if an easement option 
impacts conversion decisions, and, if so, to quantify the temporal impact of the option 
on landowners that do not preserve. The results from complex competing risks 
models which closely mimic the actual decision process suggest that the easement 
program significantly delays the conversion of eligible parcels. This delay is 
estimated at 7 years for parcels that qualify for the program without assistance from 
adjacent parcels and the conversion rate is reduced by over 45% for all easement 
eligible parcels.  
For policy makers the induced delay is important, especially in counties just 
beginning a period of rapid growth. These results suggest that having an alternative 
option to land conversion not only has the direct impact of preserving parcels, but 
also significantly delays the conversion decisions of parcels, eligible to preserve, that 




important because eligible parcels are larger than average and are capable of 
producing many new housing units. This new housing, in turn, puts pressure on 
schools, roads, utilities, and other infrastructure. These pressures are often ultimately 
alleviated by county public spending on infrastructure, but the delay in conversion 
might allow the county needed time to cope with financial pressures and may, 
additionally, soften speculative housing demand driven by ‘boom’ cycles in housing 
construction. Also, the preservation program may alleviate the need for command and 
control programs to limit conversion rates which are often challenged on legal 
grounds. 
However, not all consequences of an easement program are desirable. While 
qualified parcels may delay conversion decisions, it appears that parcels that neighbor 
a preserved parcel are more likely to develop. These permanently preserved parcels 
create positive spillover effects that make neighboring parcels more attractive to 
development. Spillover effects could arise from the scenic nature of farmland or 
simply from the reduced uncertainty surrounding future land uses which are inherent 
in non-preserved parcels. This spillover effect may exacerbate development into 
agricultural areas and has the potential to produce the undesirable patterns of growth 
many counties are aiming to prevent. Thus being aware of this potential impact in the 
policy design phase may prove crucial to promoting a desirable pattern of growth. 
The number of localities contemplating policies to preserve land is growing 
each year, so the question of generalization of these results is an important one. 
However, the uniqueness of the area under study may complicate broad 




for several reasons. First, it is a wealthy exurban county and is relatively autonomous 
with regard to land use policy because the reliance on state funds, for schools and 
infrastructure, is less than an average county. Second, the county is under intense 
growth pressure but at the same time has a long history as an agricultural county. 
There is considerable will within the existing population to fund preservation of this 
historical land use. Thus, the key findings of the dissertation may generalize to a 
limited number of areas at this point in time, but as easement programs and farmland 
preservation programs gain in popularity these results will prove useful in many more 
localities. As more counties contemplate and implement incentive based land use 
regulation the need to design policy, forecast outcomes, and evaluate impacts of these 
regulations will grow in importance and the results derived in this dissertation should 
prove useful at each point in this continuum. This work should inform policy makers 
on design issues of future policies and outline methods for researchers to quantify 
impacts which account for many of the inherent problems that are prevalent in land 





Appendix A:  The easement payout worksheet. 





Appendix B: Data 
Table B.0.1 Data Sources 
Source Label 
1990 Census files(maps or data) Census 
Howard County GIS HC GIS 
Howard County Tax Assessment HC Tax 
Howard County General Plan (1990) HC GP 
Maryland Department of Transportation MDT 
Maryland Department of Planning MDP 
Natural Soils Maps (Natural Resources Conservation 
Services) NRCS 
Soil Survey Geographic Database (NRCS & National 
Cartography and Geospatial Center, NCGC) SSURGO 
 
Table B.2 Variables and Sources 
Variable Source 
Easement HC GIS, HC Tax 
Variance 
measure HC GIS, HC Tax 
Drift measure HC GIS, HC Tax 
distBA MDT  
distDC MDT  
sluDevWithHs HC GIS, HC Tax 
sluDevNoHs HC GIS, HC Tax 
sluComm HC GIS, HC Tax 
sluSubdiv HC GIS, HC Tax 
sluPreserved HC GIS, HC Tax 
sluOpen HC GIS, HC Tax 
sluRoad HC GIS, HC Tax 
sluProtected HC GIS, HC Tax 
sluExempt HC GIS, HC Tax 
devRate HC Tax, Census 
popDen HC Tax, Census 
numLots HC Tax, MDP, HC GP 









Acres HC GIS, HC Tax 






intRate US Federal Reserve 
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